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NOTES
ASSESSING INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
JEOPARDY PROCEDURES:
RECENT LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL REFORMS
ECENT EVENTS HAVE LED THOUGHTFUL citizens, jurists, and Congressmen
to question the wisdom of allowing the Internal Revenue Service (Ser-
vice) to assess and collect taxes without prior judicial hearing' in those
instances in which the revenue is thought to be "in jeopardy."2  Con-
gress3 and the Supreme Court4 have made significant reforms which
strengthen a taxpayer's rights5 against Service intransigence or arrogance
with respect to jeopardy assessments.6 The reforms, the abuses which
prompted them, and suggestions for future congressional action are
the subject of this Note.
I. Description of the Jeopardy Provisions
A. The Current Statutory Formula
The jeopardy assessment provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
IAmong the events which have prompted the recent concern regarding the misuse
of jeopardy provisions are the Watergate-related abuses involving the Internal Reve-
nue Service, such as the "Enemies List," free-wheeling disclosure of return information,
and unauthorized IRS intelligence operations. See generally Proposals for Administra-
tive Changes in Internal Revenue Service Procedures: Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as the Oversight Subcomm. Hearings]. Prominent
among the reasons for reform was the recent practice of using jeopardy procedures
against suspected narcotic dealers. See United States v. Laing, 423 U.S. 161 (1976). See
also Rosenthal, Jeopardizing the Fourth Amendment: IRS Jeopardy Assessments After
Laing and Hall, 31 TAX L. REV. 317 (1976); Silver, Terminating the Taxpayer's Taxable
Year: How IRS Uses It Against Narcotics Suspects, 40 J. TAXATION 110 (1974).
2 Jeopardy tax procedures are found in I.R.C. §§ 6851, 6861, 6862, 6863, and 7429.
This Note is primarily concerned with section 6861, which provides that a jeopardy
assessment of past due taxes may be made whenever the Secretary or his delegate be-
lieves that there is a threat to the collection of revenue sufficient to find that the collection
thereof is in jeopardy. Commissioner's Delegation Order No. 12 authorizes each of the
58 district directors to make that determination.
3 Section 1204 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520,
added I.R.C. § 7429, which allows for the first time judicial review of jeopardy assess-
ments.
4 Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976), held that the IRS must substantiate
in some reasonable fashion its reconstruction of a taxpayer's income from a prior taxable
year.
5 Strengthening taxpayers' rights was one of the principal reasons for the many
administrative reforms of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. H. R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1976).
6 Until the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the power of the IRS with respect to
jeopardy assessments was virtually unfettered. See notes 45-52 infra. The tendency to
become unresponsive in such circumstances is a usual phenomenon of human nature
and agency development. As Lord Acton stated: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute
power corrupts absolutely." As indicated, until recently the power of the IRS in respect
of jeopardy assessments was virtually absolute.
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(Code) are set forth in sections 6851, 6861, and 6862. 7 These infrequently-
used sections8 are designed to be short cuts to the normal, time consum-
ing assessment process9 during which the taxpayer may contest his tax
liability both administratively'0 and judicially before the United States
Tax Court." Each remedy may, in normal circumstances, be fully pur-
sued prior to payment.
There are two principal types of jeopardy procedures: termination
assessments and jeopardy assessments. In termination assessments,1 2 the
Secretary or his delegate 3 is authorized to terminate a taxpayer's taxable year
immediately and to assess and collect the tax for that part of the year which
has elapsed. This provision is often used when a criminal suspect is arrested
while in possession of a large amount of cash,' 4 or when a person is caught
fleeing the country under circumstances making it questionable whether he
will return to pay tax on income earned in the United States.' 5
Jeopardy assessments are authorized by sections 6861 and 6862 of
the Internal Revenue Code. By definition these sections permit the
'Other non-assessment provisions involving jeopardy include I.R.C. §§ 6331(a), 6863-
6864. The latter two sections deal with problems attendant upon jeopardy assessments.
The former section deals with jeopardy collection, such as dispensing with the ten day
period which taxpayers are ordinarily given to satisfy their tax liability before en-
forced collection action may commence. See note 23-24 infra and accompanying text.
I According to the REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
COLLECTION OF DELINQUENT TAXES 4 (1976) (forward by Charles Davenport), reprinted in
Collection of Delinquent Taxes: Hearings Before the Oversight Subcomm. of the House Ways
and Means. Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ADnMIN. CONF. REPORT],
over eighty million tax returns were filed in 1975. During the same period, only 548 assessments
were made under the jeopardy provisions of the Code. See also REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL TO THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REvENUE TAXATION ON THE USE OF JEOPARDY AND
TERMINATION ASSESSMENTS BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERvICE 6 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GAO
STUDY].
9 I.R.C. § 6861(a) provides in pertinent part that "[i]f the Secretary believes that
the assessment or collection of a deficiency . . . would be jeopardized by delay, he
shall . . . immediately assess such deficiency . . . and notice and demand shall be
made . . . for payment thereof."
'0 After the revenue agent makes his determination, a taxpayer may request review
by the agent's group manager. If he is still not satisfied, he may request an informal con-
ference with a conferee of the District Conference Staff. The final review is conducted
by an appeals officer of the Appellate Division. See I.R.S., AUDrr OF REtmRNS, APPEAL
RIGHTS, AND CLAIMs FOR REFUND, PUbLICATION 556 (rev. ed. Oct. 1974).
11 The normal assessment procedure is set forth in I.R.C. § 6213(a).
12 I.R.C. § 6851.
13 The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Treasury. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(11).
The term "Secretary or his delegate" is defined in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(12).
1" James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), established that gain derived from
illegal activities gives rise to taxable income. In the situation described, there are pre-
sumptions that the cash seized would never be reported as income and the money would
be dissipated so that it would be uncollectable if immediate seizure were not made. See
notes 88-95 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the effects of termination
assessments creating multiple taxable years, see Harmelink & Schurtz, Jeopardy and
Termination Assessments: The Laing Case and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 7 TAX AD-
vison 708, 714 (1976).
IS This section is also invoked whenever an alien leaves the country. See I.R.C. §
6851(d). 2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss3/6
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Secretary or his delegate to assess and collect a "deficiency."' 6  An
important distinction between a jeopardy assessment and a termination
assessment lies in the fact that a "deficiency" can only exist with respect
to a taxable period which has already closed. 7 Another vital distinction
lies in the immediacy of the need and the amount of information which
the Secretary or his delegate has at his disposal when making the assess-
ment.
Within the category of jeopardy assessments, there are two sub-
classifications. Section 6861, which is the more frequently used of the
two jeopardy assessment sections, deals with jeopardy assessments of
income, estate, and gift taxes. Section 6862 deals with jeopardy assess-
ments of all other taxes, principally employment and excise taxes. Both
sections deal with already-closed taxable periods.' The difference
between the two sections lies in the requirement that a statutory notice
be issued subsequent to assessment. Assessments under section 6861
carry with them the requirement that a statutory notice, the so-called
ticket to the Tax Court, be issued to the taxpayer within sixty days after
the assessment.' 9 Issuance of a deficiency notice allows the taxpayer to
petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of his tax liability; collection
is stayed during the pendency of the redetermination if bond is posted.
2 0
An assessment under section 6862 is not followed by a statutory notice
because the assessment of employment and most excise taxes is not
conditioned upon the issuance of statutory notice.21 A taxpayer who is
jeopardy assessed under section 6862 has only one remedy: to pay the
tax assessed, file a claim for refund, wait six months unless the Commis-
sioner denies the claim within that period, and then sue for refund in the
Court of Claims or in an appropriate United States district court.
22
Jeopardy assessments abbreviate the assessment process by permit-
ting an assessment to be made prior to a Tax Court hearing. The jeop-
16 I.R.C. §§ 6861(a), 6862(a).
,7 I.R.C. § 6211(a).
18 Treas. Reg. § 301.6862-1 (1957) would allow this section to be used to terminate
a taxable year in respect of employment taxes. Such use would be extremely rare, how-
ever, as Treas. Reg. § 301.6205-1 (1960) allows for liberal and frequent adjustment with-
out interest.
19 I.R.C. § 6861(b).
20 The bond requirement is discussed in notes 263-269 infra and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6205(b) and Treas. Reg. § 301.6205-2 (1960), which state that
the amount of underpayment will be adjusted by the Secretary.
22 The question of issuance of a statutory notice under jeopardy termination pro-
cedures was recently at issue in Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161 (1976). Laing in-
volved a termination assessment under I.R.C. § 6851. That section does not by its terms
require that a statutory notice be issued. The Supreme Court resolved the issue in favor
of requiring the issuance of a statutory notice in termination cases. It is not clear how
that decision might affect a jeopardy assessment under section 6862, as the taxes in-
volved under that section are not taxes normally paid by persons on the personal in-
come.
The requirement that the taxpayer pay the tax, wait six months and file suit for a
refund in the district court or the Court of Claims is mentioned in the GAO STuDY, supra
note 8, at 10. For a discussion of new remedies under I.R.C. § 7429, see notes 227-238
infra and accompanying text.
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ardy collection provision short-cuts the customary procedure still further.
Normally, after the tax liability is finally determined by compromise,
default, or decision of the Tax Court, the taxpayer is served with notice
and demand for payment.2 3 The taxpayer is allowed ten days in which
to satisfy the tax due. Section 6331(a) authorizes immediate collection
of the tax assessed without regard for the ten-day waiting period, how-
ever, if a finding is made that the collection of such tax is in jeopardy.2 4
Other incidents of the jeopardy procedures include the Commissioner's
authority to abate and a taxpayer's right to stay collection by posting
bond. Thus, the Internal Revenue Code provides that the Secretary or
his delegate may unilaterally abate the assessment in whole or in part if
he finds that jeopardy does not exist.2 5 Such abatement authority pro-
vides some measure of relief to the taxpayer, at least if he can establish
that there exists no danger of losing the tax revenue. In addition, under
section 6863(a) a taxpayer who has become the subject of a jeopardy
assessment is allowed to file a bond as security to postpone collection
until such time as the Tax Court has redetermined the deficiency. This
section further provides that a taxpayer's property which has been seized
pursuant to a jeopardy assessment will not be sold until the time for filing
a petition with the Tax Court has expired, or if the taxpayer timely files
a petition, until the decision of the Tax Court becomes final.28 The only
exceptions to the restriction on the sale of seized property involve situa-
tions in which the property is perishable, in which the expense of main-
taining the property during the pendency of Tax Court proceedings would
greatly reduce the net proceeds therefrom at a future sale, or when the
taxpayer consents to the sale.27
Although all the jeopardy procedures are related, this Note is prin-
cipally concerned with section 6861 jeopardy assessments. The other
sections will be referred to only when necessary to supplement the
reader's understanding.
B. Origins of Jeopardy Provisions
The statutory progenitor of all of the jeopardy provisions is the Reve-
nue Act of 1924.28 Because subsequent amendments have changed the
23 I.R.C. § 6331(a).
24 Id.
25 The current provision regarding abatement is I.R.C. § 6861(g), which provides
in pertinent part: "Abatement if Jeopardy Does Not Exist. - The Secretary or his dele-
gate may abate the jeopardy assessment if he finds that jeopardy does not exist." This
subsection was added to the 1954 Code to make clear that the power to abate existed.
Prior to that time it was not thought to be within the authority of the Commissioner to
abate even an incorrect jeopardy assessment. S. REP. No. 730, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS, 2398, 2399.
26 I.R.C. § 6863(b)(3).
27 I.R.C. § 6863(b)(3)(B)(i)(iii). This section was added to the Code in 1954 to prevent
unnecessary loss to the taxpayer caused by a forced sale of his property if it was ultimately
determined that no tax or substantially less tax was due. S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 5247.
2 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(d), 43 Stat. 297.
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thrust of the statute very little, it is appropriate to examine the earliest
statutory formulation of jeopardy provisions.
As indicated, the statutory history of the current jeopardy assessment
provisions began with the Revenue Act of 1924. The same Act created
the Board of Tax Appeals, which is now known as the United States Tax
Court.2 9  That these two events occurred simultaneously is both inter-
esting and significant. Prior to the inception of the Board of Tax Appeals
(Board or BTA), the only impartial forum in which a taxpayer could con-
test his tax liability was a federal court. Payment in full of all tax
alleged to be due was and still is a prerequisite to maintaining an action in
a United States district court or the Court of Claims.30 The only remedy
dispensed by either court, therefore, was a refund. Prior law had allowed
for review within the Bureau of Internal Revenue
31 before collection.32
It was claimed, however, that such administrative review was insuffi-
cient to safeguard a taxpayer's interests in that nearly all disputes were
resolved in favor of the government.33 These hearings were conducted
in Washington only, often making it impossible for taxpayers to take
advantage even of the departmental hearing.
3 4
Congress created the BTA in order to alleviate the hardships wrought
by prior law. It acknowledged that "[t]he right of appeal after payment
of the tax is an incomplete remedy, and does little to remove the hardship
occasioned by an incorrect assessment. ' 3 5  Additionally, the Board was
to conduct hearings in major cities, thus allowing taxpayers nationwide
29 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), 43 Stat. 336.
30 The existence of a refund remedy antedates even the graduated federal income tax.
See, e.g., Act of June 2, 1872, ch. 315, § 44, 17 Stat. 257, 258. The refund suit was
necessitated, in part, because the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited a suit to enjoin collec-
tion of federal tax. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475 (now I.R.C. § 7421).
Injunctive relief is discussed fully at notes 96-132 infra and accompanying text.
31 Prior to 1939, the Internal Revenue Service was known as the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (Bureau).
32 There were general objections to the system of intra-Bureau review on the grounds
that the taxpayer is entitled to "an impartial determination of the case" where the re-
viewer is not both "judge and advocate." H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924),
reprinted in 1939-1 U.B. 247.
The review procedure called for the taxpayer to submit his claim in writing to the
Income Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The taxpayer was permitted a hear-
ing in Washington at his request. Thereafter, the Commissioner notified the taxpayer
of his decision, and, if favorable to the government, notice and demand was immediately
issued. T.D. 3269, I-1 C.B. 304 (1922).
33 An administrative ruling in the taxpayer's favor permanently barred an appeal by
the government. It is not surprising, therefore, that most decisions were in favor of the
government, with the taxpayers left to seek a refund remedy. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 254.
3 See note 32 supra
3 H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 246. The
report continues:
The payment of a large additional tax on income received several years previous,
and which may have, since its receipt, been . . . wiped out by subsequent losses
... sometimes forces taxpayers into bankruptcy, and often causes great financial
hardship and sacrifice. These results are not remedied by permitting the taxpayer
to sue for recovery of the tax after this payment.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
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the opportunity to avail themselves of review of their liability by the BTA
prior to payment of the tax.36
A concomitant of the creation of the BTA was a considerable exten-
sion of the time between the issuance of the notice of deficiency and pay-
ment, if any, of the tax.37 To protect government interests during this
extended period, the jeopardy assessment was conceived. The creation
of a jeopardy procedure was, in effect, no more than a re-enactment of
prior law, with the proviso that it was to be invoked only in exceptional
circumstances. 38
The need for a jeopardy provision was obvious. Once notified of the
government's determination of a deficiency, a taxpayer would have
ample time to leave the jurisdiction or effectively render himself judg-
ment-proof. An intervening bankruptcy could also defeat the govern-
ment's claim. In such circumstances, the prudent use of a jeopardy
assessment could preserve a taxpayer's assets in order to satisfy a defi-
ciency. Because of a finding that his tax was "in jeopardy," the jeop-
ardy-assessed taxpayer was denied the opportunity to appeal to the Tax
Court prior to payment. He remained at the mercy of the Bureau's pro-
cedures, with no right to appeal save a suit for refund.
The Revenue Act of 1924 attempted to alleviate this situation. Instead
of requiring that the jeopardy taxpayer tender immediate full payment
or suffer seizure and sale of his property in order to satisfy the alleged
deficiency, the 1924 Act offered the option of filing a bond to stay
collection. Upon posting bond, the taxpayer was permitted to file a
claim for abatement with the Bureau. 39 The bond, twice the amount of
the deficiency,40 was forfeited if the claim was rejected and the taxpayer
defaulted on payment. 4' Not only did this procedure serve to protect
government interests, but it also allowed the taxpayer who could afford to
36 Id.
37 Under prior law, collection could occur as quickly as forty days after the mailing
of the Ideficiency notice. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 265, 266, (re-
pealed 1924). Even at that, the Commissioner was authorized to levy immediately if he
believed that delay would hamper collection. Id. The Revenue Act of 1934 allowed a 60
day period for the 'taxpayer to appeal to the Board (since increased to 90 days). Then
followed several months or years before the Board's decision was announced: all this
prior to collection. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a), 43 Stat. 297.
38 "The substance of these provisions is similar, with changes made necessary by
provision for a Board of Tax Appeals, to those now contained in the second paragraph of
subdivision (d) of § 250" of the existing law. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 259.
31 In the Revenue Act of 1924, the two were dependent. Posting bond was a condi-
tion precedent to filing a claim in abatement. This is no longer true. A taxpayer may now
request abatement even if he does not or cannot file a bond. I.R.C. § 6861(g); Treas.
Reg. § 301.6861-1(f)(3) (1958).
10 The amount of bond required was reduced in 1954 to an amount equal to the de-
ficiency. I.R.C. § 6863. See S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5247. See notes 263-269 infra and accompanying text
for the most recent suggestions concerning the bond requirement.
41 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 279(a), 43 Stat. 300. It must be questioned whether
a taxpayer all of whose assets were frozen by a jeopardy assessment greatly exceeding
his net worth could raise such a bond.
[Vol. 26:413
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file a bond the opportunity to postpone or avoid inconvenient, embaras-
sing, or financially-disastrous collection.42
This short history of the jeopardy assessment provisions is offered to
demonstrate that, at the time of its enactment, the jeopardy provision was
part of a progressive reform package 43 which conferred valuable rights
upon taxpayers which had not previously been enjoyed. It might be
assumed that the jeopardy provision was universally hailed. In fact, it
seems to have passed without comment. 4 The silence was short-lived,
for within a few years a clamor arose for tighter control on the Commis-
sioner's power to jeopardy assess as the problems and abuses related to
expansive administrative discretion under the provision became ap-
parent.
II. PARAMETERS OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION: THE EARLY CASES
A. Jurisdiction of the BTA and Reviewability
The early cases indicated one persistent source of problems: the lack
of control over the Commissioner's power to impose jeopardy assess-
ments. From the outset, the Board refused to pass on the reasonableness
of the assessment or the likelihood that jeopardy actually existed. In
California Associated Raisin Co.,45 one of the earliest jeopardy cases, a
notice of deficiency was issued to the taxpayer, an agricultural corpora-
tion. When the company filed a petition in bankruptcy, its trustee
posted a bond for faithful performance. Nevertheless, the Bureau jeop-
ardy assessed. The company claimed that the deficiency notice, as well
as the trustee's bond, obligated the trustee or the surety to pay any
deficiency which might ultimately be determined by the BTA and that
government interests were thus fully protected. Accordingly, the com-
pany argued, the jeopardy assessment was unnecessary. The BTA
ignored the logical appeal of the taxpayer's argument and declined to
42 Failure to file a bond, however, also precluded any appeal to the Bureau or the
BTA. In California Assoc. Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 1251, 1252 (1925) (emphasis added),
the court stated:
The taxpayer's inability to file a bond . . . and thus to lay a foundation of
appeal creates a regrettable situation . . . [T]he insolvent, impecunious or unfor-
tunate taxpayer, who is unable to file a bond with such sureties as will satisfy
the collector, is deprived of an appeal. But we see no escape from the conclu-
sion that this is the effect of the statute.
See note 39 supra. Under current law, the taxpayer may avail himself of a Tax Court
determination of liability without posting bond. If the Tax Court finds that the tax due is
less than the amount assessed and seized, the remaining assessment will be abated.
I.R.C. § 6861(c); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6861(c), 301.6861(d) (1958).
43 No doubt the need for reform was brought home to Congress when, on the same
day that the Revenue Act of 1924 was debated on the floor of the Senate, it was an-
nounced that prior tax measures had created a 300 million dollar surplus, 67 CONG. REC.
3100 (1924) (statement of Sen. King). Several days earlier the Bureau had asked for a
149 million dollar appropriation to refund taxes which had been collected erroneously. 67
CONG. REc. 6853 (1924). Congress could afford to be generous, and had direct evidence
of the expensive sting of incorrect assessments.
44 See generally SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS
(1938).
45 1 B.T.A. 1251 (1925).
197]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW (Vol. 26:413
review the assessment. The Board determined that it lacked the juris-
diction to review, stating that "[t]hese matters are not within our author-
ity to adjudicate. Congress has expressly based the power of jeopardy
upon the Commissioner's official belief, consistently with his respon-
sibility for the protection and collection of revenue."48
California Associated Raisin Co. established that the reasonableness
or propriety of the Commissioner's belief in imposing a jeopardy assess-
ment was not open to question before the BTA or any other tribunal.
Once payment was made or bond was filed the only issue for determina-
tion was the amount of the tax liability. 47  Moreover, without payment
or posting of a bond, there was no opportunity prior to levy to appeal the
Commissioner's determination of jeopardy.
Several other issues were established regarding jurisdiction during the
first year of the BTA's existence: jurisdiction did not lie when the tax-
payer had failed to file a claim in abatement accompanied by a bond;41
jurisdiction did not lie until the time for the Commissioner's abatement
action was exhausted; 49 and jurisdiction was extinguished by payment of
the tax assessed.50  The BTA viewed its authority narrowly and construed
the statutes strictly. The results of these early determinations on jeopardy
assessments are of concern to taxpayers today. The Commissioner still
may act with impunity in imposing jeopardy assessments, 51 provided that
he follows the statutory requirements.52
B. Phillips v. Commissioner: A Constitutional Determination
Taxpayers who might have hoped for a successful constitutional chal-
lenge to jeopardy assessments experienced a severe setback in 1931
46 Id.
41 In Veeder v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 342, 344 (7th Cir. 1929), the court specifi-
cally declined to inquire into the Commissioner's reasons for imposing a jeopardy assess-
ment, limiting itself to a determination of the taxes due.
48 California Assoc. Raisin Co., 1 B.T.A. 1251 (1925). The harshness of this pro-
vision has been decreased by the requirement that a 90 day letter, the so-called ticket to
the Tax Court, be issued within 60 days after the imposition of a jeopardy assessment if
it had not been previously issued. I.R.C. § 6861(b).
" Oakdale Coal Co., 1 B.T.A. 773 (1925). The Board pointed out that the taxpayer's
day in court was merely being postponed until the Commissioner's decision on its claim
in abatement was final.
50 Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 1 B.T.A. 767 (1925). The corporate taxpayer
paid the amount of the jeopardy under protest in order to halt the accumulation of in-
terest. "There is , . . no decision which this Board can make [which] will serve the
purpose of saving him from paying an unjust or unlawful tax." The suit was deemed a
refund suit and dismissed. Id. at 769.
51 The Service has imposed some internal controls, since none are specified in the
statute. They are discussed at notes 200-215 supra and accompanying text.
12 An omission of any part of the statutory formula is fatal to the jeopardy assess-
ment. In Thornton v. United States, 493 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1974), the plaintiff alleged that
the jeopardy assessment was not approved by the delegate of the Secretary, the District
Director of Internal Revenue, but by a lesser official. The Third Circuit held that if it
were factually demonstrated, improper approval would be grounds for invalidating thejeopardy assessment. In Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969),
and United States v. Ball, 326 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1964), tailure to issue a statutory notice
after the jeopardy assessment caused the assessment to be invalidated. 8https://engagedscholarship.c uohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss3/6
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because of the decision by the Supreme Court in Phillips v. Commis-
sioner.5 3 The Phillips case considered whether the collection of revenue
by summary administrative proceedings violated procedural due process
by depriving the taxpayer of the opportunity to be heard before a taking
of his property has occurred. The Bureau sought to hold Phillips liable as a
transferee 54 for a deficiency of the defunct Coombe Garment Company of
which he had been a controlling shareholder and a distributee of the corporate
assets.55 Phillips raised questions of due process with respect to two
additional matters directly related to his transferee status: the deficiency was
that of the corporation rather than his own, and no attempt had been made to
assert the deficiency against the corporation5 6 or the other shareholders who
had participated in the distribution.5 7
In order to appreciate Phillips' claim and the constitutional issues
raised, it is necessary to understand the nature and effect of a determina-
tion of a deficiency and the subsequent assessment thereof. An assess-
ment of taxes has, for all intents and purposes, the force and effect of a
judgment.5  That Congress has chosen to forego the collection of tax
debts until after the taxpayer has had the opportunity to appeal to an
impartial body is, for the moment, immaterial. If the taxpayer fails to
file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the tax, the
deficiency is assessed and is collectible by levy or otherwise ten days
after notice and demand, unless a determination is made that collection
of the tax is in jeopardy. 59  If the taxpayer appeals to the Tax Court, he
bears the burden of proof; the Commissioner's determination that a
deficiency exists is presumptively correct. 0  In Phillips, it was the
assessment process in general which the taxpayer questioned. He argued
that the assessment against him was invalid because no judgment had
been obtained against him to bind him as a transferee.6'
Despite Phillips' claims, the Court found that the constitutionality of
tax assessment by "summary administrative proceedings" 62 had long
53 283 U.S. 589 (1931), afi'g 42 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1930) (15 B.T.A. 1218 (1929)).
54 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 280, 44 Stat. 61 (now I.R.C. § 6901). The current
Code section dealing with transferee liability is substantially the same.
55 Since assessments against transferees follow in every regard the standard (non-
jeopardy) assessment procedure, Phillips' claim was that the issue of liability must al-
ways be determined by the courts before any assessment is made.
56 The questions of procedural due process are complementary to the questions of
substantive due process involved in the nature of tax assessments in general.
57 The transferee also claimed that if he was responsible for payment, he could be
required to contribute no more than his pro-rata share. 15 B.T.A. 1218, 1220 (1929).
5 Compare I.R.C. § 6212(a) with I.R.C. § 6213(a). The Secretary "determines" a
deficiency and mails a statutory notice to the taxpayer who may petition the Tax Court
for a "redetermination" of his tax liability.
59 I.R.C. § 6213(c).
60 I.R.C. § 7454(a) places the burden on the taxpayer, except in fraud, foundation
manager, or transferee cases. The burden 'f proof in transferee cases is determined by
I.R.C. § 6902(a), which places the burden on the Secretary to show that the petitioner is
liable as a transferee. Once transferee status is shown, the burden shifts back to the pe-
titioner.
61 283 U.S. 589, 594 (1931).
62 Id. at 595.
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been settled. As early as 1880, the Supreme Court held in Springer v.
United States63 that it was not constitutionally imperative that the
Collector of Internal Revenue obtain a prior judgment in order to seize
and sell a taxpayer's property.6 4 The novel twist which allowed Phillips
to raise what appeared to be a previously settled issue was that he was not
the party primarily liable for the tax deficiency but a transferee. Because
a transferee has the opportunity for judicial review of the administrative
determination of deficiency, the Court held that due process requirements
were satisfied.
The confusion surrounding the Phillips decision concerning its effect
on jeopardy assessments arose in part because Justice Brandeis, who
wrote the majority opinion, did not limit himself to affirming the constitu-
tionality of assessments against transferees when the transferor was
judgment-proof. Instead, he went further and endorsed the constitu-
tionality of the assessment procedure in general. The opinion, referring
to Springer and other cases, stated that a taxpayer's interests, including
those of a vicariously liable transferee, were adequately safeguarded by
paying the tax and then bringing suit for a refund. The opinion also
pointed out that the taxpayer could seek a forum before payment by filing
a petition with the BTA.66 Jeopardy assessments were mentioned only
once in this context. The Court stated that "[t]his remedy [an appeal to
the BTA] may be had before payment, without giving bond (unless the
Commissioner in his discretion deems a jeopardy assessment neces-
sary). "67
The PhillipYs Court analyzed the status of property rights in the hier-
archy of government values. According to the Court, the rights to life
and liberty must be fully protected at all times from any deprivation of
due process. On the other hand, property rights occupy a somewhat
secondary position:
Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of
the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the oppor-
tunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liabil-
ity is adequate . . . Delay in the judicial determination of prop-
erty rights is not uncommon where it is essential that govern-
mental needs be immediately satisfied.68
- 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
The impracticality of obtaining a judicial determination before notification of de-
ficiency is apparent, even to the layman. The number of returns filed annually (80 mil-
lion) and the number which require adjustments of some sort (4.6 million) would make
such efforts prohibitively expensive. ADamiN. CoNF. REPor, supra note 8, at 11.
S283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931).
6 The right of p re-collection appeal was extended to all taxpayers except in bank-
ruptcy and jeopardy cases by the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 27, § 274(a), 44 Stat. 55.
Jeopardy taxpayers must file a bond, or submit to immediate levy. It is clear that the
Court felt the right of appeal to the BTA was not a necessary element for the finding of
constitutionality, but merely an extra privilege for the taxpayer.
- 283 U.S. 589, 598 (1931).
68 Id. at 596-97. The quotation emphasizes the point that the opinion considered the
assessment process in general. Although the government's need for Mr. Phillips'
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The Court then cited other situations in which important needs were
commonly thought to justify a de-emphasis of property rights: destruction
of property in public health emergencies, seizures of property in war-
time, and condemnation of property under eminent domain. The com-
parisons suffer, however, because in the hypothesized situations, the
government's need to seize private property is direct and immediate and
no other means can be employed to accomplish the goal. Such is not the
case when the collection of revenue is involved, at least if the question
involves a particular individual's tax liability. While a governmental need
exists, it is neither so direct nor so immediate as to justify abbreviated
proceedings with curtailment of the taxpayer's rights. If, as the Court
indicated, the question is the collection of revenue in general, the need is
both direct and immediate. For policy reasons, however, Congress has
chosen to forego collection before a hearing even though it is constitu-
tionally acceptable to eliminate all remedies except a suit for refund. It
is arguable that the Court should have analyzed the particular problems
of the jeopardy taxpayer as they arose because policy decisions were made
without serious considera'ion of either the consequences to such tax-
payers, the possible uses of the jeopardy provisions or the reasons why
jeopardy might be required. Since the Court neglected to do so, subse-
quent judges have simply accepted the jeopardy provisions as constitu-
tionally sound, seeking support in the all-encompassing language of the
Phillips decision.
For this reason, Phillips is frequently cited in support of the proposi-
tion that jeopardy assessments are constitutional.69 While such a state-
ment is a reasonable interpretation of the case, there are some distinctions
between jeopardy and ordinary assessments which the Court did not
consider. One such distinction concerns the existence of a deficiency.
In Phillips, the deficiency was uncontested since an actual tax liability
existed. The question was whether Phillips could be required to pay all
or part of it. In the typical jeopardy case, the existence of an actual tax
deficiency or the amount of the deficiency is hotly contested. 70 In fact,
jeopardy assessments are often inflated 7' because of the wide discretion
which the Commissioner enjoys under section 6861.72
$9,000 was not vital and did not need to be "immediately satisfied," the need to ex-
peditiously collect tax revenues in general is essential to the functioning of government.
It is the task of the courts and the Congress to strike an appropriate balance between
these two competing interests.
61 Virtually every jeopardy case since 1931 has cited Phillips. See, e.g., Commis-
sioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976); Continental Products v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d
434 (1st Cir. 1933); Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901 (S.D. Fla. 1957). This ap-
pears to have been done automatically, without serious thought given to the question of
whether Phillips actually placed a constitutional sanction on the jeopardy provisions.
70 Melvin Building Corp. v. Long, 262 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1958), involved a jeopardy
assessment. The- district court found "as a fact that substantial doubt exists whether the
plaintiff is liable for a deficiency in Federal income tax," but this was not sufficient to
"lift the jurisdictional bar" on reviewing jeopardy assessments. Id. at 922.
71 The amounts actually collected in jeopardy cases, compared with the amount of
the assessments, provide an indication of the tendency to inflate. For a further discussion,
see notes 216-226 infra and accompanying text.
1 jeopardy assessments, unlike ordinary assessments may be wholly or partly
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The other major distinction between a transferee case and a jeopardy
case is that the transferee has recourse to a prepayment forum - the Tax
Court. In contrast, the jeopardy-assessed taxpayer, in order to avoid
immediate seizure of his property, must post bond and wait for an admin-
istrative determination on abatement while his appeal to the Tax Court
is pending.7 3 Failure to post bond in effect precludes an appeal, except
with respect to a refund, because assets are frozen during the pendency
of a Tax Court case. If the taxpayer has no access to the Tax Court, as
in the case of a section 6862 assessment, and his assets are insufficient to
satisfy the alleged deficiency, even a refund remedy is foreclosed.71 The
injustice is further compounded if the assessment is an inflated one and
the taxpayer would have been capable of satisfying a reasonable estimate
of his tax liability.
75
Although Phillips is different from the ordinary jeopardy case, it
became the touchstone case on the subject of the constitutionality of
jeopardy assessments. In Phillips, the Supreme Court stated that the nor-
mal collection procedure76 is constitutional. The Court neither specific-
cally objected to jeopardy assessments nor recognized that they were an
exception to the regular assessment process. Rather, the Court merely
noted that in the case of jeopardy, a bond was required. The omission
was not surprising, however, inasmuch as the case did not involve jeop-
ardy assessments. From that tacit approval it may be inferred that the
Court sanctioned summary assessment and collection proceedings as a
method of securing revenue, and that it approved of the bond provision
as a safeguard of the taxpayer's rights where jeopardy was found. Since
abated by unilateral act of the Commissioner. I.R.C. § 6861(g). Once abated, a second
assessment for a greater amount may be imposed. United States v. Teti, 75-2 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) 9709 (D. Conn. 1975). In this respect, a jeopardy assessment is much more flexible
than an ordinary assessment. Also, jeopardy assessments, which may be issued before or
after a statutory notice, can be for a greater or smaller amount than that specified in
the statutory notice, despite the prohibition in I.R.C. § 6212(c) on assessing additional
deficiencies. This allows the Commissioner to correct an erroneously computed statutory
notice by placing the additional amount under a jeopardy assessment.
13 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 has modified the procedure somewhat. The jeo-
pardy taxpayer still bears a greater burden. For a discussion of the Tax Reform Act, see
notes 227-238 infra and accompanying text. This Act created I.R.C. § 7429, which pro-
vides for an expedited review of both the reasonableness and the amount of the assess-
ment. The new section does not lift the requirement of posting bond, nor does it prevent
improper assessments from being made or the embarrassment and financial hardship
caused by having one's assets frozen, even for a short period of time.
14 Adler v. Nicholas, 70 F. Supp. 514 (D. Colo. 1946), typifies the problem. The tax-
payer could not raise bond, as all his assets had been seized, but his assets did not satisfy
the total tax impbsed by the jeopardy assessment. The court denied review, stating that
"[tihe government ... has provided . . . a complete system of corrective justice in
regard to all taxes imposed . . . [which] is founded upon the idea of appeals within
the executive departments. If the party aggrieved dbes not obtain satisfaction in this
mode, there are provisions for recovering the tax after it has been paid. . . . But there
is no place in this system for an application to a court of justice until after the money is
paid." Id. at 517.
'5 The possibility that this situation might arise was noted early. See Revenue Revi-
sion of 1928: Hearings on H.R. I Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 521 (1928) (statement of Hugh Saterlee).
76 I.R.C. § 6213(a) provides for assessment of the deficiency accompanied by a 90-
day letter, and permits an appeal to the Tax Court.
[Vol. 26:413
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss3/6
IRS JEOPARDY PROCEDURES
the Court did not specifically analyze the constitutional implications of
the jeopardy problem, it is difficult to draw any further conclusion.
The analysis of the jeopardy provisions lacking in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Phillips continued in subsequent cases. The Phillips holding
was first applied to the jeopardy assessment problem in Continental
Products v. Commissioner.7 7  The plaintiff corporation was the subject of
a $245,000 jeopardy assessment imposed solely in order to prevent the
expiration of the statute of limitations78 and the loss of revenue which
would have resulted without the assessment. Continental raised the
question whether the prepayment remedy which Congress had created
and which was available to the overwhelming majority of taxpayers
could be constitutionally denied to the taxpayer who had been jeopardy
assessed. It further questioned the propriety of the bond requirement as
a prerequisite to an administrative review prior to seizure.7 9 Noting that
Continental had filed bond, had enjoyed an administrative review which
had resulted in the denial of its request for abatement of the jeopardy
assessment and had enjoyed a hearing on the merits"0 before the BTA
which had affirmed the Commissioner's determination of deficiency,
8 1
the court questioned whether Continental could properly raise the issues
of due process and prehearing seizure since it had exhausted both admin-
istrative and judicial reviews without having been required to pay the
deficiency assessment."2  In reaching its conclusion the Continental
court, unlike the Phillips Court, followed the time-honored judicial prac-
tice of deciding the narrowest possible issue. 3 However, in its attempt
to buttress its conclusion with judicial precedent, the court made a
shallow and erroneous analysis of Phillips which has been the source of
many problems since that time.
In Continental, the court mistakenly observed that Phillips dealt
with the question of jeopardy assessments against transferees.8 4  The
court also mistakenly observed that the transferee provisions "closely
resemble . . . jeopardy assessments of income taxes."8 5  It then con-
" 66 F. 2d 434 (1st Cir. 1933), aff'g 20 B.T.A. 818 (1930).
78 Id. at 435.
7 Note that the constitutional issues discussed in Phillips of substantive due process
for the bonding requirement, and procedural due process for access to the court, were
for the most part reiterated in Continental. The difference between the two cases lies in
the fact that Continental squarely raised the question ot jeopardy assessments when
access to the BTA before collection is conditioned upon posting bond while Phillips did
not.
80 The hearing was limited to a factual determination of the correct amount of the de-
ficiency. 20 B.T.A. 818 (1930). This is in accord with the jurisdictional principles dis-
cussed at notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
81 Id. at 820.
12 66 F. 2d 434, 436 (1st Cir. 1933).
83 It was exactly this judicial restraint which Justice Brandeis failed to exercise in the
Phillips opinion and which delayed the resolution of questions concerning the constitu-
tionality of jeopardy assessments from the beginning.
84 There was no jeopardy assessment in Phillips; only the issue of transferee liability
was before the Court. 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
8 66 F. 2d 434, 436 (1st Cir. 1933). For a discussion of the differences between a
jeopardy and a transferee case, see notes 66 & 71-75 supra and accompanying text.
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firmed the constitutionality of prehearing seizure in those cases where
jeopardy is found.86
As time passed, the combination of Phillips and Continental became a
kind of talisman in jeopardy cases. Until recently, no' one had success-
fully challenged jeopardy assessments on due process grounds.8 7
The first case in forty years to examine the reasoning of Phillips and
Continental with a view toward imposing responsibility on the Commis-
sioner for his use of the jeopardy assessment power was Commissioner v.
Shapiro.88  The Supreme Court there held that the government was
required, in response to a discovery request, to provide the taxpayer with
information concerning the basis for the assessment, for without that
information the taxpayer could not adequately contest the government's
determination of the deficiency.
The facts of the Shapiro case reveal the taxpayer's dilemma. Pur-
suant to a finding of jeopardy, the Commissioner assessed $92,000 in tax
against Shapiro on the basis of an arbitrary reconstruction of his alleged
unreported income from narcotics sales. In refusing to provide substan-
tiating data to the taxpayer, the Commissioner relied on prior case law
which held that a determination of jeopardy was unreviewable at any
time and a determination of the amount of the deficiency was unreview-
able prior to payment or the posting of bond. The Commissioner also
relied on the Anti-Injunction Statute which had been interpreted8 9 to
prevent a taxpayer from restraining the collection of federal taxes unless
he first proved that the government could not establish its claim under
even the most liberal view of the law and facts.90
In reaching its decision, the Court noted the inconsistency of requiring
the taxpayer to prove the government's inability to prevail while at the
same time denying him access to the information upon which the govern-
ment's claim was based. The Court then held that injunctive relief was
appropriate in such circumstances if the taxpayer had no adequate remedy
at law. 9'
In attempting to harmonize its holding in Shapiro with its holding in
Phillips, the Court noted the essential difference between the ordinary
assessment process and the jeopardy assessment process, suggesting that
whenever a taxpayer's right to the prepayment forum was foreclosed by
the use of a jeopardy assessment, injunctive relief should be more liber-
88 A double mistake was actually involved - the assumption that Philips involved
a jeopardy assessment and the assumption that transferee liability is the same as a jeop-
ardy assessment.
87 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 424 F. Supp. 631 (D. Ore. 1976). In Johnson,
a challenge to IRS seizure practices was asserted on the basis of recent decisions barring
pre-judgment relief by private citizens. The Court declined to apply this principle
where the collection of revenue was involved. For a discussion of this question, see
notes 140-154 infra and accompanying text.
- 424 U.S. 614 (1976).
89 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). For a discussion
of Williams Packing, see notes 108-110 infra and accompanying text.
88 Id. For a full discussion of the Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421, and interpretive
case law, see notes 96-154 infra and accompanying text.
9' Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 624-27 (1976).
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ally available. 92  The Court acknowledged that Phillips confirmed the
"statutory scheme created by Congress for the litigation of tax disputes
and in so doing referred both to the jeopardy assessment provisions and the
Anti-Injunction Act."9 3  The Court concluded that both statutes were
constitutional, at least if considered individually. However, when con-
strued together in the jeopardy context, the statutes have the effect of
creating an insoluble problem for the jeopardy taxpayer. The Court
noted that a jeopardy taxpayer whose assets were frozen-was entitled to
a "prompt ... resolution of the question of his liability by the Tax
Court," and found this to be compatible with the dicta in Phillips con-
cerning "an adequate opportunity . . . for a later judicial determination
of the legal rights."94 The Court implied that what would be an adequate
remedy for an ordinary taxpayer would not be adequate for the jeopardy
taxpayer. This implication may very well lead to further litigation.
Shapiro is thus important for two reasons: it established a ground for
injunctive relie9 5 for a jeopardy taxpayer, and it placed the Commis-
sioner on notice that jeopardy assessments would have to bear a reason-
able relationship to provable facts concerning the taxpayer's estimated or
reconstructed income. Insofar as. no court had previously attached any
consequence to the imposition of a jeopardy assessment which was not
specifically enumerated in the statute, the Shapiro case represents a
significant step forward for jeopardy taxpayers.
III. ATTEMPTS TO RESTRAIN OR PREVENT JEOPARDY ASSESSMENTS
A. Injunctive Relief
Confronted with nearly insurmountable difficulties, and, like Shapiro,
frantic to delay collection," taxpayers faced with jeopardy assess-
ments have often tried to enjoin levy. They have generally found the
equitable remedy of injunction unavailable because of the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act of 1867, which provides that "[n]o suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of tax shall be maintained in any
court."97  Since the Act is not illuminated by legislative history,98 the
92 Id. at 631.
93 Id.
94 Id.
'5 See notes 113-116 infra and accompanying text.
96 The hardship and embarassment which a jeopardy assessment may cause a taxpayer
can be readily seen in reading the many injunction cases. Forced liquidation of an ongoing
business at a distress price, evaporation of sources of credit for the taxpayer's personal
and other business use, and loss of funds to pay defense counsel in criminal tax or other
pending litigation are but a few examples of the harsh effects of a jeopardy assessment.
7 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 475 (1867) (now I.R.C. § 7421). The pro-
vision was first codified as Rev. Stat. § 3224 (1975). The language of the section was
modified in the 1939 and 1954 Internal Revenue Codes to allow for proceedings in the
Tax Court.
95 See Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite
Statutory Prohibition, 49 HARV. L. REv. 109, 110 & n. 9 (1935).
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case law must be relied upon to discover the extent and effect of the
prohibition. 99
In Snyder v. Marks,00 the Supreme Court construed congressional
intent as a desire to limit all prior review of tax assessments to the
Treasury Department and to prohibit the courts from entertaining all
tax suits except for refund litigation. In the years immediately following the
passage of the sixteenth amendment, it became apparent that a much
more complex and pervasive tax structure was developing, and the courts
relented somewhat in this position. 101
The first case to set forth guidelines defining situations in which an
injunction would issue was Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. 0 2 In
Standard Nut, the taxpayer had secured a Treasury ruling which had
determined that its product was not oleomargarine and that it was con-
sequently not subject to the federal tax on oleo products. When the
Bureau ignored the Treasury ruling and imposed a jeopardy assessment
that would have forced the taxpayer into insolvency, the Supreme Court
granted an injunction. The Court reasoned that because of the ruling,
the attempt to assess amounted to "an exaction in the guise of a tax."
The Court also found that "special and extraordinary circumstances
[existed] sufficient to bring the case within some acknowledged head of
equity jurisprudence.'"'0 -Standard Nut established two elements
required for an injunction: illegality 04 and special circumstances.
In the ensuing years many have tried, though few have succeeded in
enjoining the collection of tax. Early successful cases involved trans-
ferees where assessments were improperly made'0 5 or where the collector
9 An excellent discussion of the history and development of case law under this Act
can be found in Note, Jeopardy Assessments: The Sovereign's Stranglehold, 55 GEO. L.J.
701 (1967). See also Kaminsky, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Jeopardy
Assessments, 14 TAx L. REv. 545, 548 (1959). Kaminsky argues that the reason for the
Anti-Injunction Act was eliminated by the creation of the Tax Court. Prior to its creation,
if an injunction was issued to restrain the collection of federal taxes, a judicial vacuum
would have resulted, since no court was empowered to determine actual tax liability.
1- 109 U.S. 189 (1883).
101 The Supreme Court, in Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 122 (1916), recognized
that circumstances might exist in which an injunction would be appropriate. Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) was the first case to grant an injunction. The Court reasoned
in Hill that the tax was so high as to cause widespread harm, and a post-payment remedy
would be inadequate to prevent the destruction of an entire industry.
102 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
103 Id. at 509.
104 It must be noted that illegality is a very high standard to meet. It is not enough that
the tax sought to be collected is unconstitutional. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20 (1922), held that the tax on goods manufactured by child labor was unconstitu-
tional. However, in Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922), decided the same day as
Drexel, the Court declined to enjoin the collection of the child labor tax.
105 Shelton v. Gill, 202 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1953). The defendant was a bona fide
purchaser of the delinquent taxpayer's business and was not liable as a transferee. In
Rosenthal v. Allen, 75 F. Supp. 879 (M.D. Ga. 1948), the transfer took place prior to the
accrual of the taxpayer's deficiency. The assessment against the transferee was held void.
In Trinacia Real Estate v. Clarke, 34 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1929), there was no assessment
against the delinquent taxpayer while the assessment directly against the transferee was
found to be illegal.
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(district director) wrongfully refused bond'0 6 or where the taxpayer's
property was improperly sold.
0 7
Even fewer injunctions were issued during the sixties, principally
because of the decision in Enochs v. Williams Packing and Navigation
Co., 0s which modified the injunction formula established in Standard
Nut. In Williams Packing, the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer had
to prove that "under the most liberal view of the law and the facts,
the United States cannot establish its claim."'09 Standard Nut spoke in
terms of "illegality"; the construction of that term in Williams Packing
related a confusing reference to a more familiar standard. In essence,
the taxpayer must establish that he is entitled to the equivalent of sum-
mary judgment in order to obtain injunctive relief. The Court also
emphatically stated that the question of special circumstances did not
arise until the petitioner had established that the government could not
prevail. In addftion, the Court de-emphasized the "special circum-
stances" test, stating that "if Congress had desired to make the avail-
ability of the injunctive remedy . . . depend on the adequacy of the
legal remedy, it would have said so explicitly."1 0
Inasmuch as it may be assumed that the Service does not involve
itself in litigation unless it has at least a chance of prevailing under a
liberal view of the law and the facts, it follows that injunctions will seldom
be available. There have been some recent cases, however, in which the
courts have concluded that an injunction might issue. Two such cases,
.Commissioner v. Shapiro"' and Pizzarello v. United States," 2 involved
the method by which deficiencies were computed.
In Shapiro, a taxpayer was about to be extradited to Israel to stand
charges for securities fraud. The day before his departure a jeopardy
assessment was imposed against him. Jeopardy apparently existed
because of the likelihood of Shapiro removing funds from New York banks
in order to make bail and to pay legal fees for his defense. On the basis
of unexplained cash bank deposits, the Service estimated unreported
income from sales of hashish amounting to $137,280.113 Shapiro's
10 Yoke v. Mazzello, 202 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1953). Personal and real property of the
taxpayer and friends, appraised at double the amount of the deficiency, was offered as
security. An injunction was issued to require that the security be accepted and to fore-
stall the sale of the taxpayer's property.
107 Smith v. Flinn, 261 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1958), modified, 264 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1958).
The IRS either ignored the statutory prohibition of I.R.C. § 6863(b)(3) against selling
seized property while Tax Court proceedings were pending, or wrongly determined that the
taxpayer's property was perishable as defined in I.R.C. § 6336. Smith's non-perishable
corn and grain were consequently sold in an unfavorable market at a great loss. The
injunction prevented the Commissioner from selling the remainder of Smith's grain in the
same depressed market.
"08 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
19 Id. at 7.
'10 Id. at 6. Hence the ruination of the taxpayer's enterprise or other irreparable injury
is not a sufficient reason to allow injunctive relief.
" 424 U.S. 614 (1976).
11 408 F.2d 579-(2d Cir. 1969).
"I On the basis of periodic bank deposits, the IRS reconstructed Shapiro's income.
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bank accounts were then seized. The Supreme Court held that an injunc-
tion was proper under the circumstances because the Service had failed to
demonstrate that the reconstruction of the taxpayer's income had any
basis in fact,'14 because the Commissioner had refused to provide Shapiro
with information concerning the method used to compute the deficiency,
and because irreparable harm" 5 would have resulted from a denial of
the funds."16
The facts and result in Pizzarello"7 were similar. The Second Circuit
there indicated that an injunction would be appropriate in a jeopardy
case in which the Service had reconstructed the taxpayer's income for
five prior years from gambling activities. The basis of this estimate was
$490 in cash and wagering slips found in Pizzarello's possession at the
time of his arrest in his Mount Vernon, N.Y. luncheonette" 8 and $126,000
found in a search of the premises. The Service then estimated Pizzarello's
income from bookmaking at nearly three million dollars and jeopardy
assessed $280,000. The government then seized the $126,000 to
satisfy part of Pizzarello's tax debt."9 The court held that it was improp-
er to base the estimate of gambling income on the 126,000 because
the search warrant for Pizzarello's luncheonette was voided for lack of
probable cause and, as a result, the money was excluded from evidence
at his criminal trial on gambling charges. The court then concluded that
it was impossible to reconstruct Pizzarello's income from illegal wagering
on the basis of the $490 and the 10 betting slips which were in his
possession at the time of arrest, as these represented only three days'
take. Further, the court stated that it was impossible to assess taxes on
gambling income for a five year period because the criminal prosecution
alleged wagering activities for a two week period and there was no evi-
dence tending to indicate that Pizzarello had been engaged in taking
wagers for any greater period of time."' The Pizzarello court upheld
the issuance of an injunction under the Williams Packing rationale because
There were six bank deposits totalling $14,900 made at irregular intervals over a six-
month period. With very little other evidence, the Service concluded that Shapiro was
dealing in at least two kilos of hashish per week, and, using the street and wholesale
prices of hashish, estimated his costs and his profit.
114 There was no conclusive proof that Shapiro was in fact a narcotics dealer, although
some circumstantial evidence existed. He had never been indicted in the United States
for drug charges nor had he been prosecuted in any other country for narcotics-related
crimes.
'15 He would be unable to make bail or pay an attorney to defend him on pending
criminal charges.
118 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that the majority opinion was a reaction "to
administrative excesses" by the Service in dealing with "suspected narcotics operatives"
and speculated that in "a more temperate and untroubled time" the decision, insofar as
it modified Phillips, might be regretted. 424 U.S. at 635.
I" Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969).
18 Id.
119 It is standard practice for law enforcement agencies to notify the IRS of arrests in
which cash, narcotics, stolen goods, or the like are confiscated. See Silver, Terminating
the Taxpayer's Taxable Year: How IRS Uses It Against Narcotics Suspects, 40 J. TAXA-
TION 110 (1974); Tarlow, Criminal Defendants and the Abuse of Jeopardy Tax Procedures,
22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1191 (1975).
1- 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969). The criminal trial resulted in acquittal.
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the estimates of the gambling income were completely unsupportable.
In so doing, the court refrained from analyzing the impact of its decision
on the long-standing rationale of Phillips.
Because most jeopardy assessments imposed against individuals
involved in or suspected of criminal activity are made on a conclusory
basis, 21 Shapiro and Pizzarello place a heavy burden on the Commis-
sioner to establish the reliability of his reconstruction of income. This
burden is. not unreasonably heavy, however, in view of the consequences
to the taxpayer who is subjected to a jeopardy assessment.
The issuance of an injunction was likewise upheld in Sherman v.
Nash.12 2  The Third Circuit stated that if, as the taxpayer alleged, a
jeopardy assessment was imposed not out of a good faith concern for the
protection of the revenue but to harass a taxpayer, the issuance of an
injunction would be proper.123 The court stated that "a jeopardy assess-
ment made in good faith may have a myriad of incidental effects some of
which may beneficially inure to other departments of government [in this
case the Department of Justice which sought Sherman's testimony at
hearings on organized crime]," but where the jeopardy assessment is
used "as leverage to exert pressure on a taxpayer for non-tax purposes
...such unauthorized acts [are not shielded] from judicial review.' 124
It should be noted that the availability of an injunction in these cir-
cumstances depends entirely upon a finding that the principal purpose of
the assessment was not the collection of revenue. The same argument
was advanced in Bob Jones University v. Simon12 5 in which the Court
held that an admission by the University that the revocation of its tax-
exempt status would subject it to a tax liability of over one million dollars
was clear evidence of the fact that the principal purpose of the suit was to
collect revenue.126  A companion case, Commissioner v. Americans
United, Inc., 2 7 raised substantially the same issue with substantially the
same results. 28  While it can be argued that neither Bob Jones nor
American United was a jeopardy case, 129 they might, nevertheless,
present a barrier to the jeopardy taxpayer seeking injunctive relief.
121 Since those engaged in criminal activity usually do not keep records of their income
from illegal endeavors, the IRS must make estimated reconstructions of their income from
the available sources. Shapiro placed a burden on IRS officials to insure that such estimates
have at least some basis in fact.
1- 488 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1973).
i2s Sherman testified that the IRS' motive was to harass him and to coerce his testimony
before a New Jersey grand jury investigating racketeering and organized crime. A
memorandum prepared by the federal agent who subpoenaed Sherman tended to con-
firm that allegation. 488 F.2d 1081, 1083 & n. 5 (3d Cir. 1973).
124 488 F.2d 1081, 1084 (3d Cir. 1973).
in 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
'z 416 U.S. 725 (1974). The University's tax-exempt status was revoked because of
its refusal to admit Negro students. Although no jeopardy assessment was involved in
the case, the petitioner did raise the issue of the Service's good faith intent to protect
revenue. It was alleged that the prime motive was to penalize the University for its
segregationist policies.
12 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
128 Id. at 738.
129 It should be noted that the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1207,
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While it is easier for the jeopardy assessed taxpayer to obtain injunc-
tive relief since the decision in Shapiro, most taxpayers will still be
frustrated in their attempts to secure equitable relief. Indeed, one of the
ironies of the Shapiro decision is that it grants relief to the suspected
racketeer who is subjected to a jeopardy assessment on the basis of
arbitrarily reconstructed income, but leaves other taxpayers who are
jeopardized without relief.130  Although the unrestricted availability of
injunctive relief would have been one way of limiting the power of the
Service, this approach was not chosen by Congress.13 1  Perhaps this
was done because virtually every jeopardy taxpayer can show irreparable
harm, and the equitable nature of an injunction remedy would put the
Service at a disadvantage.' 3 1
B. Declaratory Relief
It is not uncommon for a jeopardy assessment to be imposed when the
tax-exempt status of a non-profit organization is revoked. Such -tax-
payers have often attempted to obtain declaratory relief. 33 Such attempts
proved unsuccessful, however, because the Declaratory Judgment Act
134
precluded declaratory relief in federal tax cases. The Tax Reform Act
of 1976 created an exception to this prohibition, however, by permitting
the granting of declaratory relief in order to determine the taxpayer's
status. This remedy is available irrespective of whether the revocation of
non-profit status is accompanied by a jeopardy assessment. 3 5  Under
the reform provision, declaratory relief is not available to an individual
taxpayer or to an institutional taxpayer other than a tax-exempt
charitable organization13 8 whose qualification or status is in question.
90 Stat. 1520, (codified at I.R.C. § 7428), created the right of tax-exempt organizations,
primarily those qualified under I.R.C. § 501, to seek a declaratory judgment to determine
their status if it should be revoked by the IRS.
130 While most jeopardy assessments are brought against known or suspected criminals,
the ordinary taxpayer may also be jeopardy assessed. See GAO STUDY, supra note 8, at 6.
131 For a 4iscussion of the reforms, see notes 227-246 infra and accompanying text.
132 The remedy created is an adversary proceeding in which the district court will
make findings of fact as to the existence of jeopardy and the reasonableness of the
assessment.
133 The following cases are examples of unsuccessful attempts to obtain declaratory
relief: Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Commissioner v. Americans
United, Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974); Paul Matthews v. United States, 74-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH)
9346 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Commonwealth Development Ass'n of Pa. v. United States, 365
F. Supp. 792 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
134 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). This Act implemented a "[clongressional policy of guar-
anteeing the timely collection of national revenues, free from undue litigation outside of
the Tax Court." Yannicelli v. Nash, 354 F. Supp. 143, 151 (D.N.J. 1973), S. REP. No. 1240,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935).
135 By reason of new Code section, I.R.C. § 7428(a), jurisdiction for declaratory relief
lies in the Tax Court and the Court of Claims. A taxpayer may appeal only after he has
exhausted all administrative remedies.
13a The declaratory judgment remedy is also extended to organizations qualified as
charitable donees under I.R.C. § 170(c)(2), private charitable foundations under I.R.C. §
509, and private operating foundations under I.R.S. § 4942(j)(3). 20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss3/6
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The inclusion of this new section remedies a potential abuse: the
revocation of tax-exempt status for political or other reasons. 13 7 Since
revocation was frequently made retroactive and was accompanied by a
jeopardy assessment, 13 8 this Code section represented an important
reform in jeopardy procedures. As before, however, the individual faced
with a jeopardy assessment is clearly foreclosed from declaratory re-
lief.13 9 The fact that the circumstances in which a declaratory judgment
may be granted are strictly defined leads to the conclusion that Congress
intended to preclude individuals faced with the prospect of a jeopardy
assessment from seeking declaratory relief. Thus, the reform in this area
is incomplete.
C. Sniadach and Procedural Due Process Objections
A tactic which jeopardy taxpayers have recently attempted has met
with even less success than have the attempts to secure injunctive or
declaratory relief. Inspired by such Supreme Court decisions as Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.,140 which held that pre-judgment relief is ordinar-
ily not available to private parties, jeopardy taxpayers have argued that
jeopardy assessments, like pre-judgment garnishment 4' and pre-hearing
termination of welfare benefits, 42 violate basic notions of procedural due
process. Such contentions have been universally rejected by the
courts. 143 There are several reasons why the Sniadach reasoning has not
been accepted in tax collection cases. 44 First, the United States Consti-
tution specifically authorizes the Congress to "lay and collect [t]axes."'145
It is obvious that the power to collect taxes is essential to the proper func-
131 H. R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 282-87, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3178-84. The Act would permit declaratory relief for an organiza-
tion which was denied tax-exempt status. See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans Against the War v.
Voskuil, 389 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Mo. 1974). The Act would grant declaratory relief, as well,
to taxpayers whose exempt status was revoked. See, e.g., Commonwealth Development
Ass'n of Pa. v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 792 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Universal Life Church v.
United States, 72-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9467 (E.D. Cal. 1972) ("bogus" church and social
welfare organization whose primary purposes were determined to be other than those
claimed in securing tax-exempt status); Jolles Foundation v. Moysey, 250 F.2d 166 (2d
Cir. 1957) (suspected communist affiliations).
13 For example, the jeopardy assessment in Commonwealth Development Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 792 (M.D. Pa. 1973), was over two million dollars. When dealing with such
substantial amounts of money, the availability of declaratory relief is vital to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer would be entitled to a concurrent hearing to determine the existence of
jeopardy and the reasonableness of the assessment under I.R.C. § 7429.
139 Prior to the creation of I.R.C. § 7428, it was at least arguable that an individual was
entitled to declaratory relief. However, the limitation of that section to organizations
clearly indicates congressional intent to exclude individuals from the scheme. See notes
135-136 supra.
140 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
141 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
142 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
143 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 424 F. Supp. 631 (D. Ore. 1976); Universal Life
Church, 72-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9467 (E.D. Cal. 1972).
144 Some .of these arguments are set forth in the discussion of Phillips. See notes 53-
76 supra and accompanying text.
45 U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8, cl. 1.
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tioning of government. An adequate safeguard may lie in the fact that
those responsible for the tax laws are the elected representatives of the
people. While the framers of the Constitution may have failed to fore-
see the development of a multilayered system in which the responsibility
for both policy making and administrative decisions would be shared
between elected representatives, political appointees and career bureau-
crats, it is clear that they intended plenary taxing power to rest with the
Congress. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to quarrel with the way
in which Congress has chosen to exercise its power, absent a finding of
unconstitutionality.
Second, the propriety of the grant to the Treasury Department of the
power to assess and collect taxes was settled in the early case of Springer
v. United States,4 ' in which procedural due process arguments on the
issue of tax collection generally were advanced and rejected. In Springer,
the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary for revenue claims of
the United States to be reduced to judgment. 47  This holding was
expressly confirmed in Phillips with respect to the ordinary assessment
procedures and impliedly confirmed with respect to jeopardy assessment
procedures. 148 The Springer and Phillips decisions represent practical,
common-sense applications of the philosophy of the framers regarding
the power to collect taxes. 49
The Supreme Court acknowledged procedural due process arguments
in Fuentes v. Shevin. 50 In passing upon the constitutionality of Florida's
replevin statute, which allowed a merchant to repossess goods without a
formal hearing, the Court stated that seizure had been allowed in limited
circumstances in which there was a clear need for immediate action, the
person executing the seizure was a government officer, and the seizure was
essential to secure important governmental or public interests. "Thus,
the Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect the internal
revenue ... "151
Sniadach and its progeny do not provide support for the proposition
that jeopardy assessments are unconstitutional, but they do serve as a
barometer by which one may predict the judicial climate and the mood of
the American public. 5 2 It would seem that in the mid 1970's people on
the whole are legs willing to trust power and authority. They are more
sensitive to abuses of official discretion, and more anxious to exercise
some control over government agencies thought to be too powerful and
146 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
147 See also Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U.S. 69, 75 (1877), in which the Court held that it
would be unreasonable to impede tax collection to satisfy the whims of "every litigious
man.
148 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931).
149 See note 64 supra.
1- 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
151 The Court then cited Phillips in support of this statement. 407 U.S. 67, 91-92
(1972).
152 There is no reason why, despite the fact that such measures are constitutional,
they must be continued unabated if their undisciplined use shocks and offends the American
public.
[Vol. 26:413
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss3/6
IRS JEOPARDY PROCEDURES
intractible.' s ' It is in this context that Congress and individual citizens
are examining the practices of the Service in the execution of jeopardy
assessments.
IV. SPECIFIC ABUSES OF THE JEOPARDY PROVISIONS
A. Tolling the Statute of Limitations
The earliest abuse of the jeopardy provisions involved the imposition
of a jeopardy assessment to prevent the expiration of the statute of
limitations 5 4  and resulting loss of revenue.1 5 5  This use of the proce-
dure was particularly prevalent during the twenties. Under the early
tax laws, the difficulty frequently encountered in determining the basis
of stocks and other assets often resulted in staggering deficiencies, 56
so that the Bureau constantly ran several years behind in assessments.
Under such circumstances, it became common practice to impose jeop-
ardy assessments indiscriminately in order to prevent the limitation pe-
riod from expiring.15 7
The outcry which resulted from this early practice was predictable.
The American Bar Association (ABA), which offered an amendment
specifically revoking the Bureau's authority to jeopardy assess for the
purpose of tolling the statute of limitations, argued that the very existence
of a statute of limitations constituted notice to all of the expiration
date. 5  The ABA amendment also proposed that the taxpayer be given
the opportunity to petition the United States district court or the BTA "to
declare the jeopardy assessment void, if such tribunal finds that no
jeopardy in fact existed."'59  The amendment was defeated after the
Bureau assured the committee that since it was nearly current in its
Hence the renewed interest in congressional oversight committees such as the
Subcommittee on Oversight of Internal Revenue Procedures of the House Ways and Means
Committee.
154 The current statute of limitations is found in I.R.C. § 6501. Assessments must be
made within three years, with an extension to six years if the taxpayer has substantially
understated his income. In the case of fraud, willful evasion or failure to file a return,
no limitation exists.
155 Prior law had, in fact, specifically provided that the imminent expiration of the
statute of limitations constituted jeopardy. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d),
42 Stat. 266 (repealed 1924).
156 One of the most spectacular of these cases involved James Couzens, a Michigan
congressman and minority stockholder in the Ford Motor Company. In order to determine
Couzens' gain on the sale of his Ford stock, it was necessary to determine his basis as
of 1913. Shortly before the statute of limitations was to expire, the Commissioner re-
vised his valuation downward from $9,000 to $3,000 per share, thereby increasing the
taxable gain on the sale from two to eight million dollars. The Commissioner then
jeopardy assessed Couzens for the additional tax. James T. Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040
(1928).
157 See Revenue Revision of 1928: Hearings on H.R. I Before the Ways and Means
Comm., 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 532-33 (1928) (statement of Hugh Saterlee).
158 Id. at 543.
159 Id. at 466. The adoption of this amendment in 1928 would have prevented some
of the hardships imposed on subsequent jeopardy taxpayers, but the amendment was
defeated.
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review of returns, it would no longer routinely impose jeopardy assess-
ments for this purpose.160
The classic example of a jeopardy assessment imposed for the pur-
pose of preventing the expiration of the statute of limitations can be found
in the 1936 case of Foundation Co. v. United States.'16  The Service
admitted that it did not know how much tax was due from the taxpayer,
that it had not prepared a case against the taxpayer, and that it had not
even formulated a theory under which, to proceed. The statute of limita-
tions, as extended by the taxpayer's waiver, was about to expire. Accord-
ingly, the Commissioner imposed a jeopardy assessment of $450,000.112
Because there was no question but that the taxpayer was a financially
responsible corporation which could and would pay the amount assessed,
it was argued that the Commissioner was required to issue the customary
notice of deficiency, which would toll the running of the statute of
limitations, in order to preserve the corporation's right to a prepayment
appeal. The court brushed aside this claim by noting that the Commis-
sioner was not required to issue a deficiency notice because his authority
to impose a jeopardy assessment was discretionary. The court also
refused, for the same reason, to comment on whether the Commissioner's
action in imposing the assessment was reasonable or even necessary. 6 3
As the court in Foundation Co. pointed out, the issuance of a notice
of deficiency tolls the running of the statute of limitations, but the
flexibility of a jeopardy assessment makes it a more desirable tool
under the circumstances.6 4  In current practice jeopardy assessments
are infrequently used for this purpose, but the threat of a jeopardy
assessment is sometimes used to coerce individual taxpayers or their
representatives into extending the statute of limitations.165
That the Service should have the absolute, unlimited, and unre-
viewable power to cause substantial hardship by imposing or threaten-
ing to impose a jeopardy assessment because of its own failure to pre-
pare an adequate case against a taxpayer prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations is unreasonable and objectionable. It is submitted
that Congress should act to curtail this practice by statute. Without
congressional action, each affected taxpayer would be required to con-
test the jeopardy assessment by suit in district court under section 7429.
Such action would be an expensive, time-consuming, and frustration-
ridden method of curtailing an undesirable practice.1
6
160 Id. at 532.
' 15 F. Supp. 229 (Ct. Cl. 1936). Though the case was decided in 1936, it involved
a deficiency from 1918 and a jeopardy assessment made in 1925.
162 Id. at 247. It may be assumed that the $450,000 assessment was the greatest pos-
sible tax liability which could have been asserted against the company.
"I3 See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
164 See note 72 supra.
165 Taxpayer Assistance and Compliance Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations of the Comm. on
Appropriations of the Senate Finance Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1974) (statement
of Clyde Maxwell) [hereinafter cited as Approp. Hearings].
166 q., I - -~aA R-v-v q-vw Pnir'v C, pmT P-4-R-. (Mnr. 2.4 l.°ki0 fnr thp
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B. The Jeopardy Assessment As A Penalty For Illegal Acts
The jeopardy assessment at times has been used by the government
as a weapon to penalize criminals or unpopular elements. A recent
case, Lenske v. United States,167 illustrates this practice. Reuben
Lenske, a politically-active Portland, Oregon attorney who had been
affiliated with left-wing causes, was jeopardy assessed $508,000
shortly after his conviction for criminal tax fraud.16 8  The jeopardy
assessment and criminal conviction involved the same taxable year.
While it seemed reasonable to assume that an individual who at-
tempted to evade taxes would be likely to remove or dissipate the as-
sets, thereby creating the classic jeopardy situation, the assessment
was not made for that reason. Rather, the investigating revenue agent
recommended the jeopardy assessment because of Lenske's "unortho-
dox social and political views."'' 9
The Ninth Circuit Court reversed Lenske's criminal conviction.
70
The defendant also succeeded in obtaining an abatement of the jeop-
ardy assessment, primarily because of the statement made by the
revenue agent. A recomputation of his income resulted in a $2,000 re-
fund for the tax year.' 7 '
Another example of the use of jeopardy provisions to attain non-
revenue goals involves the Narcotics Traffickers Program. Until 1974,
the Service conducted an active program aimed at harassing and inter-
fering with individuals engaged in narcotics trafficking. The Shapiro
case 72 is an example of the manner in which the program functioned.
The Narcotic Traffickers Program entailed the extensive use of jeopardy
and termination assessments 73 to deprive narcotics dealers of their
use of jeopardy assessments. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, HANDBOOK FOB IN-
TERNAL REVENUE AGENTS, which specifically prohibits the threat of a jeopardy assessment
for the purpose of extending the statute of limitations. These materials were entered
into the public record by Donald C. Alexander then Commissioner of Internal Revenue
during his testimony at the Oversight Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 379.
167 66-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9686, rev'd, 383 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1967).
168 See generally Approp. Hearings, supra note 165, at 353-74 (statement of Reuben
Lenske).
169 Id. at 355.
170 383 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1967).
,71 Approp. Hearings, supra note 165, at 356 (statement of Reuben Lenske).
172 For a discussion of Shapiro, see notes 88-95 supra and accompanying text.
173 I.R.C. § 6851. This section provides for immediate seizure of property to satisfy
tax liability. In a termination case, the Commissioner declares the taxpayer's current
taxable year terminated and assesses tax for that short year on the basis of the income
received prior to the termination. See Silver, supra note 113; Tarlow, supra note 113.
The Narcotics Traffickers Program was initiated in 1971 as a part of President Nixon's
efforts to combat drug abuse. Statistics from the GAO STUDY, supra note 8, at 6, for the
fiscal years 1972 to 1975 show the number of assessments made during the height of the
program:
Fiscal year
1972 1973 1974 1975 Total
Jeopardy assessments
(note a):
Narcotics Traffickers Program 98 141 113 60 412
Other 200 358 413 150 1,121
I9Q AQQ r9R 91M 1 rq1I
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operating funds.'74 When the Program was discontinued amidst strong
criticism, 175 then Commissioner Donald Alexander announced that the
administration believed that the expenditure of time and money on the
Narcotics Traffickers Program was not justified by the amount of revenue
it produced; accordingly, it would no longer be entitled to dispropor-
tionate emphasis or funding.
It is universally accepted that drug abuse must be reduced, and that
the illegal drug business produces taxable income which necessarily
leads to the intervention of the Internal Revenue Service. It is objec-
tionable, however, to permit a financial penalty to be imposed which is
so severe as to render a taxpayer indigent overnight, merely because
the individual was suspected of income producing criminal activity.
Such action contradicts the fundamental concept of substantive due
process.
In United States v. Hall 176 drug enforcement officers searched Mrs.
Hall's Kentucky residence following the arrest of her estranged hus-
band on narcotics charges in Texas. The officers found one gram of
marijuana and one amphetamine crystal hidden on the premises. Mrs.
Hall maintained that the drugs belonged to her husband and that she
had been unaware of their presence in her home. Nonetheless, Inter-
nal Revenue agents recommended termination of her taxable year and
a jeopardy assessment of $52,000 for the month of January was issued.
Her income for the month was reconstructed in the same manner as
Shapiro's, based on estimates of volume, and wholesale and street prices
of narcotics. Pursuant to the assessment, Mrs. Hall's car was seized and
sold, causing her substantial hardship and embarrassment.1 77  These
Termination assessments:
Narcotics Traffickers Program 999 2,448 1,523 304 5,274
Other 73 143 125 34 375
Total 1,072 2,591 1,648 338 5,649
Combined assessments:
Narcotics Traffickers Program 1,097 2,589 1,636 364 5,686
Other 273 501 538 184 1,496
TOTAL 1,370 3,090 2,174 548 7,182
It should be noted that the increase in jeopardy assessments against narcotics suspects
was accompanied by a significant increase in the number of other jeopardy assessments
made. These comparisons indicate an attitude of increased zeal, or callousness depending
on the reader's point of view, regarding the collection of revenue by this extraordinary
method.
'14 See Oversight Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 379 (statement of Donald C.
Alexander). A serious problem with the program was that an IRS "conviction" was often
based on flimsy or circumstantial evidence, and that the resulting "sentence" was an
assessment far beyond the taxpayer's ability to pay. For an example of this practice and
its effect, see, e.g., Laing v. United States, 42.3 U.S. 161 (1976).
115 Speech to the Tax Section of the American Bar Ass'n. reported in 41 J. TAXATION
315 (1974).
176 United States v. Hall, was consolidated with Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161
(1976).
"' The items, fohnd in a film canister in the piano, belonged to the taxpayer's es-
tranged husband. A thorough search of the house yielded no other drugs or narcotic para-
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actions were all taken in the absence of even a criminal charge of pos-
session or distribution against Mrs. Hall. The Supreme Court held that
in the circumstances, Mrs. Hall was entitled to injunctive relief and to
a hearing before the Tax Court on the issue of her tax liability.'
C. The Prima Facie Case
Among the reforms advocated by those who seek to limit the au-
thority of the Service to impose jeopardy assessments is the declaration
that there must be objective standards by which to determine when
jeopardy exists. No specific standards are enumerated in the Code. By
policy statement, however, the Service has set forth reasonable, ob-
jective standards. Unfortunately, the application of these standards
has been overly broad.
Under the terms of the policy statement, a jeopardy assessment
may only be imposed if one of three conditions exists: 79 the taxpayer
is or appears to be18 0 preparing to flee the United States or to conceal
himself; the taxpayer is or appears to be preparing to place his prop-
erty beyond the reach of the Government by removing it to another
country or by transferring, concealing, or dissipating it; or the taxpay-
er's financial solvency is or appears to be threatened.s'
These three conditions represent situations in which the imposition
of a jeopardy assessment is an appropriate response because the ulti-
mate payment of tax reasonably appears to be in doubt. Except for the
uncomfortable vagueness of the phrase, "appears to be," the standards
are simple, to the point, and capable of consistent administration. How-
ever, instead of clarifying the quantum of evidence necessary for a rev-
enue agent reasonably to determine whether jeopardy exists, and
thereby narrowing the circumstances in which jeopardy may be found,
the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM or Manual) set forth situations held
to constitute prima facie cases of jeopardy.8 2 The prima facie case
phernalia. For the testimony of Mrs. Hall's attorney, see Oversight Subcomm. Hearings,
supra note 1, at 245, 247 (statement of Donald M. Heavrin).
178 423 U.S. 161 (1976). Prior to this case, the Service had maintained that it was not
required to issue a statutory notice in termination assessment cases under I.R.C. § 6851.
171 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, POLICY STATEMENT P-4-88 (Mar. 24, 1960), was in-
serted into the public record during the Oversight Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1,
at 378. The conditions are not contained in the statute. They represent the Service's
interpretation of jeopardy situations and are subject to change and revision at any time
without notice to or consent of Congress.
IS0 The intial judgment as to what constitutes jeopardy or an appearance of jeopardy
is left to the revenue agent, who makes the decision after consulting with the Intelligence
Division. The agent's recommendation is then reviewed and personally approved by
the district director.
"I1 As was pointed out by Professor William T. Plumb, Jr., this third criterion should
be clarified to indicate that a jeopardy assessment should be issued only when a delay
would result in probable loss of tax revenues. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1,
at 263.
IS The approval and review procedures are set forth in Rev. Proc. 60-4, 1960-1 C.B.
877; the conditions are specified in INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL II (CCH) § 4584.5 (1971).
The prima facie case provisions have been abandoned. See note 202 infra.
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has since been abandoned. The provisions are discussed here to give
historical context to reformers' demands.
According to the Manual, a district director 183 may authorize a
jeopardy assessment without further approval any time a prima facie
case exists.1 84  It is submitted that the prima facie case' policy had the
effect of inducing careless or unnecessary jeopardies, and of signifi-
cantly broadening the instances in which jeopardy may be found. Jeop-
ardy assessments, according to the Manual, are warranted if the tax-
payer: is a "major operator" in the criminal field;18 5 has a prior history
of activity in illegal enterprises, even if he is currently engaged in a "so-
called legitimate business;"'8 is engaged in activity which is generally
regarded as illegal, if there is a possibility of large unexpected losses
caused by the interference of other criminal elements; 87 is a frequent
gambler who wagers large amounts;188 is engaged in taking wagers; 89
or is known or suspected of designing to leave the United States without
providing for tax payments. 90
The Manual further sets forth situations in which a jeopardy as-
sessment may be used in order to secure tax revenue to the detriment
of other creditors. Thus, jeopardy exists when the taxpayer is engaged
in a legitimate business but consistently suffers business or personal
losses, 19' is in a difficult financial position or has doubtful ability to
make good the tax deficiency in the future, 192 or has a large damage
suit pending or threatened against him. 93  The reasoning behind these
183 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL II (CCH) § 4584.5 (1971).
184 If the jeopardy is based on other than a prima facie case, the district director must
secure prior approval from the Director, Audit Division in Washington, D.C. See note 202
infra for the recent modification of this policy.
185 "Major operator" is nowhere defined. This omission may lead to confusion as to
who is a "major" and who is a "minor" operator.
8 This reflects a presumption that all persons with records of convictions should be
subject to jeopardy assessments, as -the-"major operator" criterion is not mentioned
here.
"87 Examples given are blackmailers and hijackers. It should be noted that legitimate
businesses, too, are subject to large unexpected losses due to criminal acts such as
robbery, kidnapping, and extortion.
188 No attempt is made to define "frequent" or "large amounts" or to indicate what
type of proof would be necessary to demonstrate that the taxpayer is a known gambler.
For example, would anyone who receives a Form 1099 at the racetrack automatically
be suspect?
188 Apparently, bookmakers are not "major operators" in the criminal field.
8 While it seems sensible to do so, the Internal Revenue Manual does not limit this
provision to those who are leaving the country permanently. Vacationers and tourists
are all leaving the country under the specified circumstances.
I" A jeopardy assessment made against an individual in this position would quite
possibly force the taxpayer into insolvency, thus permanently depriving the government
of the desired tax revenue.
182 This situation permits the revenue agent to make a recommendation of a jeopardy
assessment on the basis of his opinion of the taxpayer's future financial condition. While
there are many situations in which such findings would clearly be warranted, the po-
tential for abuse is substantial.
I" The merit or the possibility of settlement of the suit apparently need not be con-
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provisions is based on the fact that federal taxes do not necessarily en-
joy first priority in a bankruptcy proceeding." 4 However, if an assess-
ment is made and a notice of federal tax lien is filed prior to bankruptcy,
the United States is entitled to first priority with respect to real prop-
erty. 19 5 The United States is also entitled to first priority with respect
to personal property provided that the personalty has been seized prior
to bankruptcy. 96 Through the use of a jeopardy assessment prior
to bankruptcy, the United States may satisfy its own claims from avail-
able assets, thus defeating other creditors.19 7
The final instance involving a prima facie case of jeopardy concerns
the taxpayer who has a history of avoiding or resisting the payment of
taxes. This provision could conceivably be used against any individual
who had at any time in the past been indebted for taxes, despite the
fact that a good faith dispute may actually have existed as to the liabil-
ity. If the criterion is meant to apply only to those who have been
convicted of criminal fraud or willful failure to file a return, the Man-
ual does not so state.
As has been suggested, the criteria for a prima facie case are sub-
ject to manipulation, principally due to overbreadth and the failure to
define precisely the operative terms. Such manipulation constitutes
an abuse of discretion granted for the sole purpose of protecting the
revenue. That such abuse has not frequently occurred' is no de-
fense. 99  It is submitted that Congress should confine the exercise of
discretion by setting forth in the Code those situations in which the
Secretary or his delegate may exercise his discretion.
D. Ineffective Internal Controls
Because of the general nature of the standards for determining the
existence of jeopardy, and the potential for abuse, it would appear nec-
essary to implement meaningful internal controls to prevent overzealous-
194 Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
195 Id. § 67b, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1970).
196 Id. § 67a(3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(3) (1970).
1W7 In an impending damage suit, the jeopardy assessment is imposed before a final
judgment in the suit is entered. See, e.g., United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank,
340 U.S. 47 (1950).
198 See Oversight Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 409 (statement of Donald C.
Alexander). The Commissioner indicated that if the agency functioned properly, such
incidents would seldom occur. However, it is impossible to demonstrate abuse of dis-
cretion in a system which, until recently, declined to review even clearly outrageous dis-
cretionary acts. See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
199 IRS does not keep separate records on the number of jeopardy assessments, the
reasons for the finding of jeopardy, or the disposition of jeopardy cases by abatement,
posting bond, etc., or the final amount assessed by the Tax Court in each case. This lack
of documentation makes it more difficult to determine whether the provisions are being
abused. The GAO Study, which examined jeopardy assessments in two IRS districts, in-
dicated that most jeopardy assessments were imposed on those with criminal affiliations,
and that those jeopardy assessments actually issued during the period examined were
justified and reasonable in amount. However, the Study is limited and does not provide
information on procedures used prior to 1974, or on procedures used in the 56 other IRS
districts. GAO STuny, supra note 8, at 9.
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ness by IRS agents and to guarantee greater uniformity between internal
revenue districts. 200  Present guidelines are limited, however, and in-
ternal controls are virtually nonexistent. The "safeguards" which have
been built into the system by the Service consist of the requirements that
the district director personally approve each jeopardy assessment, and
that jeopardy assessments are to be used sparingly.20'
A recent directive requires that the IRS Regional Counsel review
proposed jeopardy assessments. 20 2  The review is for the purpose of
determining whether a successful defense could be made if the jeop-
ardy assessment were challenged by the taxpayer. 20 3  The statement
itself, however, provides an exception to the general rule of pre-as-
sessment review by indicating that "in many situations there will be
insufficient time" to obtain the opinion of Regional Counsel before making
a jeopardy assessment.20 4  This means that the district director is em-
powered to make the decision to impose a jeopardy assessment with-
out securing prior advice of counsel if he believes that the exigency of
the situation demands immediate action.2 0 5  The palliative of Regional
Counsel review is thus seriously undercut by this exception.
Post-assessment review remains unchanged from that prescribed in
1960,206 except for the addition of post-assessment review by Regional
Counsel in those situations in which prior review is not obtained. Re-
view of all jeopardy assessments, including closed cases, is conducted
at the Regional Office in order to insure that policy and procedure are
followed, and to recommend corrective measures when the assess-
ment is considered unnecessary or excessive.2 0 7  Moreover, a selected
number of jeopardy assessment cases are post-reviewed in the Audit
Division at the National Office in order to evaluate and coordinate
jeopardy procedure. 208 Current procedure calls for the completion of
the review within sixty days in order to allow for the timely filing of an
accurate statutory notice of deficiency.20 9
200 Uniform administration was a continuing concern of congressional investigators.
See generally Oversight Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1; Approp. Hearings, supra note
165.
201 Rev. Proc. 60-4, 1960-1 C.B. 878; INTERNAL REVENUE SERViCE PoLIcY STATEMENT
P-4-88 (Mar. 24, 1960), entered in the public record in Oversight Subcomm. Hearings,
supra note 1, at 378.
202 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL II (CCH), Supplement 45G-272, § 3.01 (Nov. 5, 1976).
m Id. The review is to concentrate on justification for the belief as to the existence
of jeopardy and the reasonableness of the computation of the deficiency, based upon in-
formation available at the time of assessment.
214 Id. § 7.01. In such cases, the file will be referred to Regional Counsel for review
immediately following the assessment.
205 If one is to believe the testimony of Meade Whitaker, then Chief Counsel of the IRS,
regarding the need for nearly instantaneous action in the vast majority of jeopardy cases,
including the necessity of assessment on the basis of an insufficient and incomplete in-
vestigation, this would mean that the District Director would be in substantially the same
position as before. See Approp. Hearings, supra note 165, at 614 (statement of Meade
Whitaker).
206 Rev. Proc. 60-4, § 3.01-02, 1960-1 C.B. 878.
207 Id. § 3.01.
20- Id. § 3.02.
'09 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUEL II (CCH), Supplement 45G-272, § 4.03 (Nov. 5, 1976)..
I.R.C. § 6861 (b) requires the issuance of a statutory notice within 60 days.
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Review by the National Office suggests that the taxpayer's appeal210
may result in full or partial abatement, which would be reflected in the
statutory notice 211 unless one had been issued prior to the jeopardy
assessment.2 1 2  However, such review does not appear to influence the
district director's decision in the majority of cases, perhaps because
the proof offered by nefarious characters who are the most likely tar-
gets of jeopardy assessments213 is itself suspect.2 1 4
Irrespective of other reforms which may be instituted, stronger in-
ternal controls, including a mandatory preassessment review by Re-
gional Counsel,215 are necessary so that the jeopardy power cannot be
used indiscriminately.
E. Inflated Assessments
Despite the limitations imposed by Shapiro216 and the Tax Reform
Act of 1976,'217 the Commissioner's judgment with respect to the
" The intra-department review is prescribed by I.R.C. § 6861(g) and Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6861-1(e)-(f) (1957).
21 It is important that the amount assessed in the statutory notice be accurate for two
reasons. The amount finally assessed cannot be increased if the taxpayer files a timely
petition with the Tax Court. I.R.C. § 6212 (c). If the deficiency claimed is found to be
arbitrary and excessive, the burden of proof shifts from the taxpayer to the government.
Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935).
212 Although the IRS keeps no records on this subject, the testimony of Meade Whitaker
and other IRS officials before congressional committees indicate that jeopardy assessments
are often made hastily with incomplete information. An attempt is made to maximize
the assessment in order to protect government interests. The haste with which jeopardy
assessments are made frequently causes substantial errors in the nature of over-assessments.
See note 205 supra; Approp. Hearings, supra note 165, at 613. The feeling in the past
has been that such errors must be tolerated in order to accomplish the goal of securing
revenue. As the court noted in Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F .2d 645, 650 (7th Cir.
1957), nothing in the Code requires that "jeopardy assessments be based upon computa-
tions fitted together with the accuracy of Dutch tiles."
213 The taxpayer may show at the agency review level, with the full facts at his
disposal, that the assessment is too high or is unnecessary. The fact that many jeopardy
assessments are litigated and that the ultimate tax liability is often much lower than the
assessment is an indication that the IRS is less than responsive to the taxpayer's proof
presented at the administrative review. See Note, Jeopardy Assessments: The Sovereign's
Stranglehold, 55 GEo. L.J. 701 (1967).
214 Control over the decision to abate is not as important as control over the initial
decision to assess because the immediate seizure which accompanies assessment can
cause severe problems for the taxpayer despite the fact that the assessment may later
be abated. As Mr. Justice White stated the quintessential due process quandry in Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972), noting that it is incorrect to assert as a "general
proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone."
2"15 The speed can be preserved by putting the review on a highest-priority basis.
Speed in a jeopardy assessment is a somewhat relative consideration because a jeopardy
assessment under I.R.C. § 6861 arises only in the context of an on-going audit. The
situation in which the taxpayer is at the airport with $500,000 in a suitcase is unlikely to
occur without the prior knowledge provided by surveillance and intelligence activities.
216 424 U.S. 614 (1976). The case allows an injunction to issue where the Commis-
sioner can show no reasonable basis in fact for the amount of a jeopardy assessment and
the taxpayer is able to show that he would otherwise suffer irreparable harm. See notes
88-95 supra and accompanying text.
"lI For a discussion of I.R.C. § 7429 concerning the administrative and judicial review
of jeopardy assessments, see notes 227-246 infra and accompanying text.
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amount of the deficiency is still paramount.218 It is evident in cases
petitioned to the district court under Code section 7429 that the Com-
missioner's determinatiofi will be presumed correct, because the tax-
payer has the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the amount
of the assessment.2 9
Examples of inflated assessments are found in the Report of the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States on the Collection of Delin-
quent Taxes.220 The report cites a case involving an assessment of over
three million dollars against a taxpayer whose net worth was no more
than $40,000.121 In another case, "every bit of property . . . of both
taxpayers . . . [was] seized." 222  According to the report, the average
jeopardy assessment in recent years has been well over $200,000, and
the tendency to inflate is a serious concern to Service management.2 23
In testimony before the Oversight Subcommittee on Internal Reve-
nue Taxation, William T. Plumb stated that "theoretically the jeopardy
assessment is supposed to be supportable, but they can assess any
amount . . . and sometime, years later perhaps, you may get the Tax
Court to find you didn't owe it after all."22 4 Still another witness, a
former Service attorney now in private practice, stated that "any
jeopardy assessment I have ever seen has always been grossly inflated.
I believe these jeopardy assessments are deliberately made so
because they do not want the assets seized under the jeopardy assess-
ment released under the bonding procedure .... 225
While subjecting jeopardy assessments to judicial scrutiny will most
likely eliminate the clearly arbitrary and excessive assessments,2 28
there is still the probability that inflated assessments will persist in
the substantial gray area in which the Service will enjoy its traditional
freedom. The district court, in reviewing the assessment, will probably
not wish to assume the role of the Tax Court in determining the final
tax liability. The best hope for judicial scrutiny is that the Service will
be influenced to moderate its assessments through the taxpayer's ac-
cess to a public forum.
218 For a discussion of hbw the district courts will handle the reasonable assessment
cases, see notes 219-232 infra and accompanying text.
219 I.R.C. § 7429(g)(2). A presumption exists that the assessment is reasonable, even
if the government fails to meet its burden to prove that jeopardy exists.
220 ADMIN. CONF. REPoRT, supra note 8, at 63-66. The Administrative Conference's
Taxation Section has some distinguished members, including Sheldon S. Cohen, Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue under the Johnson Administration.
221 Anthony J. Petrone, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 787 (1959).
12 Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901, 902 (S.D. Fla. 1957) (emphasis in original).
223 ADMIN. CONF. REPORT, supra note 8, at 63.
224 Oversight Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 258 (statement of William T.
Plumb).
225 Approp. Hearings, supra note 165, at 366 (statement of Clyde Maxwell).
228 Assessments such as the conclusory ones in Shapiro and Pizzareo, supra notes
111-112 will almost certainly be invalidated. Other assessments will probably stand the
test of judicial scrutiny
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V. THE IMPACr OF THE TAX REFoRM Acr OF 1976
A. New Code Section 7429: Judicial Review of Jeopardy
The principal reform provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 af-
fecting jeopardy taxpayers227 is Code section 7429. This section was
added to the Code in response to demands for legislative controls over
the jeopardy procedure. The demands were not new. Similar proposals
were made by the ABA in 1928 and 1957.228 It became clear in the
post-Watergate era, however, that the time for reform had finally
arrived.
Section 7429 grants to the jeopardy taxpayer the following rights:
the right to a complete statement within five days of the assessment
indicating the reasons for the determination that the revenue is in jeop-
ardy and the computation of the deficiency, 29 and the right to an
administrative review upon request within thirty days after the written
statement is issued.23o The Code characterizes the Secretary's review
of the jeopardy assessment as a "redetermination." The use of that
term indicates that the assessment is to be re-examined completely,
taking into consideration information supplied by the taxpayer and
other information which was unavailable at the time of the assess-
ment.231 This review must be completed within fifteen days. 2
If the taxpayer is not satisfied with the results of the administrative
review, he may file a petition with the district court for the district in
227 Less sweeping reforms dealt with correction of errors and declaratory relief. Under
prior law a taxpayer could not object to a Service finding that mathematical or clerical
errors of the taxpayer had resulted in a deficiency in tax until the additional tax had been
collected. I.R.C. § 6213(b)(1). The 1976 Tax Reform Act inserted a new provision to
allow the taxpayer an opportunity to appeal a redetermination of the tax prior to levy.
I.R.C. § 6213(b)(2). A provision allowing declaratory judgments for tax-exempt organiza-
tions was added: I.R.C. § 7428. See notes 133-139 supra and accompanying text.
221 See text at note 159 supra for a discussion of the 1928 ABA amendment. The
1957 proposals of the ABA Section on Taxation were embodied in H.R. 5043, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (196C). The bill was not enacted. The proposals are also contained in
ABA Report 221-23 and in the ABA Section on Taxation, 1958 Program and Committee
Reports, 159-60 (1957). See also Approp. Hearings, supra note 165, at 237 (testimony
of William T. Plumb).
229 I.R.C. § 7429(a)(1). Under prior law the taxpayer could, on request, have access
to the Revenue Agent's Report (RAR) concerning the recommendation of a jeopardy
assessment. This is a standard one page worksheet that states the amount of the de-
ficiency and the reason for the recommendation.. The backup information and intelli-
gence reports were unavailable to the taxpayer. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings, supra
note 1, at 404, 409 (statement of Donald Alexander).
230 I.R.C. § 7429(a)(2). Previous procedure, Treas. Reg. § 301.6861-1(d) (1957),
required the taxpayer to file a bond with the District Director within 10 days of notice
and demand. The reform provision gives the taxpayer more time to prepare his argu-
ments and to make an informed appraisal of the validity of the IRS' jeopardy claim.
231 I.R.C. § 7429(a)(3). Even if the taxpayer has no evidence to offer tending to show
that jeopardy does not exist, the District Director must re-examine the assessment on
request. This was not the case under prior procedure. Treas. Reg. § 301.6861-3 (1957).
232 On the sixteenth day the taxpayer may appeal to the district court. I.R.C. § 7429(b)
(1)(B). Under previous practice, the review did not have to be concluded speedily.
The only requirement was the Service's self-imposed regulation that internal review should
be complete before issuance of the statutory notice (60 days after the assessment). See
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL II (CCH), Supplement 45G-272 (Nov. 5, 1976).
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which he resides233 within thirty days of notification of the Secretary's
decision or within forty-five days after submission of his review re-
quest, whichever comes first.234 The district court may then make a
final, unreviewable determination235 whether the jeopardy assessment
was reasonable and whether the amount assessed was appropriate. Both
determinations are to be made with reference to the facts and circum-
stances of each case.2 36
Remedies which might be awarded by the court include ordering
complete or partial abatement of the assessment, redetermination of
the deficiency, and such other relief as is appropriate.237  Presumably
this latter alternative could include a requirement that the Service
notify creditors and lending institutions that the dispute had been re-
solved in the taxpayer's favor, hopefully to restore the flow of credit needed
to keep the taxpayer's business afloat. Other remedies could include
compelling a release of funds to provide for the maintenance of a tax-
payer's property during the pendency of the Tax Court litigation. This
procedure has been suggested as a means of protecting the interests
of both the government and the taxpayer 238 in a jeopardy assessment.
Code section 7429 could prove to be very useful to jeopardy tax-
payers depending on the degree of innovation and flexibility which the
district courts manifest when confronted with actions of this nature.
Certainly the fact that district court decisions are final and unreview-
able will have some tendency to influence the nature of decisions under
this section. 239
Also to be considered is the quantum of evidence which will be re-
quired by the district courts in order for the taxpayer to meet the burden
of proof. It is logical to assume that the standard will be the same as that
required by the Administrative Procedure Act,240 inasmuch as an ac-
233 I.R.C. § 7429(e). In the case of a corporation, the action may be commenced in
the district court in the district in which the principal place of business is found. 28 U.S.C.
9 1402(a)(I)-(2) (1970).
-I.R.C. § 7429(b)(I)(A)-7429(b)(1)(B).
235 Id. § 7429(f).
-Id. § 7429(b)(2)(A)-7429(b)(2)(B).
-7 Id. § 7429(b)(3).
28 See Recommendations of the Admin. Conf. of the U.S., 41 Fed. Reg. 1867, 1869
(1976). Logically, if the taxpayer's property is permitted to deteriorate, the amount it will
bring at a subsequent sale is reduced; likewise, the value of the property is reduced if the
taxpayer resumes possession after a judgment in his favor.
239 I.R.C. § 7429(f) states that the district court's decision "shall not be reviewed by
any other court." There is some doubt whether immunity from appellate review would
extend to a situation in which a district court fashioned a novel remedy which conflicted
with another part of the statute. For example, if a district court ordered the IRS to accept
something other than the standard bond as security to delay collection under I.R'C. § 6863,
or in the instance where the factual determination -of the district court is clearly erroneous,
the decision might be subject to review. In any event, the IRS is certain to test the extent
of the prohibition at the earliest opportunity.
240 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970)). In
administrative hearings, the standard of proof is met if the claim is supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record as a whole. This is somewhat less demanding than the
traditional preponderance of the evidence test.
[Vol. 26:413
34https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss3/6
IRS JEOPARDY PROCEDURES
tion pursuant to Code section 7429 resembles a challenge to agency
action which is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.2 4 1 The
possible application of the standards of the Administrative Procedure
Act for judicial review of jeopardy assessments was advocated over
fifteen years ago.2 42  The argument was based on the grounds that the
determination of jeopardy is purely an agency decision based bn find-
ings of fact, not unlike a decision by the Federal Communications
Commission to withhold a broadcasting license. Thus, the argument
concluded, the decision should be reviewable in the same manner as
other agency action.2 43
Because the quantum of proof is not specified in section 7429, a
court might require that another standard, such as the usual pre-
ponderence test, be satisfied.2 44  On the other hand, the Service might
be held to a more relaxed standard to establish the existence of jeop-
ardy, while a heavier burden could be placed on the taxpayer to estab-
lish the unreasonableness of the assessment. Such different standards
could result from the assumption that the existence of jeopardy, 245
once established, implies bad faith on the part of the taxpayer.
2 46
Because no cases have been reported under section 7429, the pre-
ceding considerations amount to mere speculation. Because appellate
review is foreclosed, however, it is unlikely that a single standard will
be forged. For this reason, the failure of Congress to specify com-
pletely the procedure to be followed may work to the detriment of
many taxpayers. Congress should, therefore, supplement section 7429.
B. Further Reforms Needed
Although some of the shortcomings of the judicial review formula
instituted for the benefit of jeopardy taxpayers have already been dis-
cussed, it should be reiterated that the Tax Reform Act of 1976 has
provided a significant advancement of the rights of. the jeopardy tax-
payer. While reform is still under consideration, Congress should take
241 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
242 Kaminsky, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Jeopardy Assessments Under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 14 TAx L. REv. 545, 563-566 (1959).
243 Id. Kaminsky's proposition was rebutted in Gould, jeopardy Assessments: When
They May Be Levied What to Do About Them, N.Y.U. 18th INST. on FED. TAx 937, 948-49
(1960). In his rebuttal, Gould pointed to the plenary taxing power of Congress, granted
by the Constitution. Since Congress has now chosen to allow judicial review of jeopardy
assessments, however, it seems logical to apply the ready-made standards of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.
244 It is doubtful that the court could or would apply ab initio the clear and convincing
standard used in fraud and transferee cases even if bad faith were alleged.
245 If the Commissioner fails to show to the court's satisfaction that jeopardy exists,
the taxpayer need not present evidence as to the reasonableness of the assessment. The
Commissioner's only alternative at that point is to issue a 90-day letter provided that one
has not already been issued, for the same or a greater or lesser amount, and to wait for
an adjudication by the Tax Court.
246 See text at note 179 supra, enumerating the three circumstances in which a jeopardy
assessment may be imposed. Bad faith could be found where a taxpayer is fleeing the
country or disposing of assets. However, bad faith could not be found where the jeopardy
was prompted by the taxpayer's doubtful financial solvency.
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additional steps to protect more fully the interests of those subject to jeopardy
assessments.
1. An Action for Damages
Smith v. Flinn 4 7 is an example of a case in which a damage remedy
could appropriately be afforded to the jeopardy taxpayer. Acting under
a jeopardy assessment, the Service seized grain stored in Smith's silo.
The Service then erroneously determined that the grain was perish-
able,2 48 and proceeded to sell it, under the provisions of Code section
6863(b)(3), prior to a decision by the Tax Court. At the time of the sale,
the market was in a depressed state, and the taxpayer lost a substantial
amount which could have been obtained if the grain had been stored
until conditions became more favorable. The Eighth Circuit Court sub-
sequently granted an injunction to prevent the sale of additional grain
at a loss. 2
4 9
Whatever the final decision of the Tax Court in Smith, the taxpayer
suffered a loss. 2 50  Because the loss was occasioned by the govern-
ment's error in determining the property to be perishable, an action in
tort to recover actual pecuniary damages would seem to be justified.
The Federal Tort Claims Act, however, precludes suits "arising in re-
spect of the assessment or collection of any tax."25' This exception in
the Act embodies the practical policy considerations of allowing reve-
nue to be collected without interference, and of allowing public officials
to exercise their responsibilities without fear of personal liability.
252
Still, it would seem that an "exception to the exception" is needed to
protect the Interests of jeopardy taxpayers.
Whenever the government seizes a taxpayer's property, under any
of the jeopardy provisions, before a decision of the Tax Court is ren-
dered, the United States should be liable in damages for the misuse of
or damage to the property caused by its negligence. The damages
would include deterioration of the property due to failure to adequately
maintain, repair or protect it,2 53 or for conversion, such as occurred
in Smith v. Flinn.25 4
247 261 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1958) modified 264 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1959).
24s Perishable goods are defined in I.R.C. § 6336. The list clearly excludes storable
agricultural products.
249 261 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1958), modified, 264 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1959).
250 If he were ultimately found to owe tax, a larger total quantity of grain would have
to be sold to satisfy his debt; if no additional tax were imposed, he would have lost profit
and some of his expenses due to the improvident sale.
251 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1970). The exclusion precludes both agency level and judicial
relief.
252 See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities, 77 YALE L.J. 1104, 1150-55 (1968).
' In Young v. United States, 75-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9574 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the
Service jeopardy assessed a construction company and mistakenly seized a building be-
longing to the plaintiff which was a construction company located on the banks of the Saw
Mill River. The United States Meterological Service notified residents of an approaching
tropical storm and the possibility of flooding near the river. Sandbagging was advised.
The Service did not sandbag and when the building was returned to the plaintiff after the
mistake was discovered, storm damage and lost rents amounted to nearly $10,000. A
damage suit was foreclosed by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1970).
-4 264 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1959).
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Recovery of damages should of course be limited to cases in which
seizure precedes the opportunity for a Tax Court determination of lia-
bility, and should further be limited to recovery of pecuniary losses
actually suffered. Clearly, no taxpayer should be able to make a claim
for pain and suffering or infliction of mental distress.25 5  Moreover,
damages awarded should be strictly compensatory and not puni-
tive. Z56
Another aspect of damages involves the recovery of attorney's fees
incurred in pursuing judicial relief. In 1974, the American Bar Associa-
tion recommended that when a taxpayer's property is wrongfully sold,
the taxpayer should be entitled either to the services of a government
attorney to recover the property from the tax-sale purchaser, or to re-
imbursement for the fees of counsel privately retained for the same
purpose. Failing recovery, the government should, according to the
ABA proposal, be required to restore to the taxpayer the difference be-
tween the sale price and the fair market value of his property.
25 7
The ABA proposal seems unreasonable in this latter demand. When-
ever conversion is claimed, the taxpayer should be required to elect
his remedy - recovery of the property or money damages. It hardly
seems fair to allow both. The ABA based its recommendation on the
argument that amounts which a taxpayer must expend in order to re-
cover property wrongfully converted by the government result in an un-
constitutional taking of property without due process.2 58 This due pro-
cess argument appears questionable, though the underlying equity of
the proposal, that the government restore a wronged taxpayer to his
original position, has much to recommend it.
Congress has recently taken action with respect to attorney's fees in
tax cases. In an amendment to the civil rights laws,2 59 a provision was
inserted into the section entitled "Proceedings in Vindication of Civil
Rights" which provides that if an action is brought "by or on behalf of
the United States, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of
the United States Internal Revenue Code . . . " and if the taxpayer
prevails, then, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs." 260
The provision appears to promise to all taxpayers the right to re-
cover attorney's fees, but the Service can be expected to take the posi-
tion that cases in the Tax Court and litigation for refunds in the dis-
trict courts or the Court of Claims represent actions initiated by the
taxpayer and not by the United States. If the courts adopt this position,
the provision would apply only to criminal prosecutions and to suits in
255 Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities, 77 YALE L.J. 1104, 1155 (1967).
258 Awards of punitive damages in general are prohibited by the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
257 See Approp. Hearings, supra note 165, at 389 (statement of Robert Soled).
258 Id.
-9 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970), as amended by Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641.
260 Id.
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which the government actually initiates the court proceedings, such as
suits to foreclose federal tax liens. 26' The provision would not provide
much relief to the ordinary taxpayer.
Congress should consider granting discretion to the district courts in
the award of attorney's fees to taxpayers who prevail in actions under
section 7429.262 Such awards could be justified on the ground that an
unsupportable or grossly exorbitant jeopardy assessment constitutes
harassment of the taxpayer.
2. Revision of the Bond Requirement
Among the recommendations made in the Administrative Confer-
ence Report, 26 presented to the Oversight Subcommittee when it was
drafting the House version of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, was a pro-
posal that the amount of bond required to stay collection be lowered .0
Presently, the amount of the bond is equal to the amount of tax as-
sessed.26 5  If the amount assessed greatly exceeds the value of the
taxpayer's property, it will be virtually impossible for him to secure a
bond from any commercial bonding company.2 6 This situation is not
at all uncommon for a jeopardy taxpayer because of the tendency toward
inflated assessments.26 7
The Administrative Conference Report recommended that the amount
of bond required to stay collection be reduced to an amount equal to
the "net proceeds expected to be realized at a forced sale of any or all
such property the release of which is sought. '2 68 Such a reduced bond-
ing requirement would provide security equal to the amount that the
government could ultimately hope to recover, while at the same time
making a stay of collection possible for most jeopardy assessed tax-
payers.
A drawback to this proposal is that a taxpayer's property would
have to be appraised in order to determine its forced-sale value. If the
proposal were adopted, it would be necessary to determine who would
261 A prevailing defendant's recovery would be further limited to situations where the
government's suit was frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith for the purpose of
harassment. According to Congressman Kastenmeier, attorney's fees would be awarded
so rarely that, "[i]t is expected that the cost to the Federal Government will be negligible."
122 CONG. REC. H12161-12162 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
202 I.R.C. § 7429 allows the district courts to review the existence of jeopardy and
the reasonableness of the assessment if the taxpayer so requests by filing a petition within
45 days of the assessment.
0 See note 8 supra. The recommendations were printed in 41 Fed. Reg. 1867, 1868
(1976).
264 I.R.C. § 6863(a).
2e See notes 39-42 supra for a history of the bond requirement.
200 Although it was established in Yoke v. Mazello, 202 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1953), that
the Service must accept adequate security if such is provided by friends of the taxpayer
and not a commercial bondsman, such instances are rare. Most taxpayers must rely on
commercial sureties.
"7 For a discussion of inflated assessments see notes 202-212 supra and accompany-
ing text.
"8 41 Fed. Reg. 1867, 1869 (1976).
[Vol. 26:413
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appraise the property and who would bear the expense. These matters
should be specified by statute or by a supporting Treasury regulation in
order to avoid confusion and delay. A simple compromise would be to
have each party secure an appraisal at his own expense, 2M and to
average the two in order to determine the amount of the bond. Other
compromises are possible. The problems involved are miniscule com-
pared to the hardships incurred by a taxpayer who faces immediate
seizure and is unable to make bond. It is important that Congress act on
the Conference's proposal in order to make the availability of a bond
to stay collection a real safeguard of the jeopardy assessed taxpayer's
interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that jeopardy procedures are necessary for effective
administration and collection of taxes by the Internal Revenue Service.
Jeopardy procedures serve to protect all taxpayers from the additional
burdens which they would have to bear if certain taxpayers were per-
mitted to abscond with or conceal funds which rightfully should be
paid in taxes to the government. It has been demonstrated, however,
that the Service has at times abused the jeopardy power to the detri-
ment of individual taxpayers. Recent internal reforms, such as the
abolition of the prima facie case, hopefully evidence a new responsive-
ness to taxpayer rights and a commitment to the responsible use of
jeopardy procedures. The impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, espe-
cially in creating the right to judicial review of jeopardy assessments,
will undoubtedly be another factor motivating the Service to use the
jeopardy proyisions providently. The availability of a damage remedy
would also undoubtedly result in a more circumspect use. A lowered
bond requirement would permit taxpayers to retain their property dur-
ing the litigation of the tax claim, greatly reducing the government's
exposure to damage claims.
It is vital that these reforms be completed as soon as possible. The
existence and use of revenue procedures which are considered to be
oppressive and unfair serve to undermine the public's confidence in
the federal tax structure and the self-assessment system upon which
the country so heavily depends for the collection of its revenue.270 Pru-
dent and restrained use of jeopardy procedures would help to restore
the public's confidence in a system in which the power to tax truly
"entails the power to destroy."271
MARGARET M. ARMEN
269 The taxpayer might be required to use the services of a member of the Society of
Real Estate Appraisers or another professional organization in order to insure that a
reasonable estimate of value is obtained.
270 See, e.g., Holtzman & Dear, Needed: New Curbs on the IRS, READER's DIGEST,
January 1977, at 87.
271 McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 431 (1819).
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